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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 1, 1973

72-936 - U.S. v. Robinson
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

~nprtutt <!fcmt

cf tqt 'J[tttittlt .:§taftg
'IJatlJrhtgtcn,JD. <!f. 20~'1-~

CHAMBERS OF

November 1, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 72-936 -- United States v. Robinson

Dear Bill:
In due course I shall try my hand at a dissent
in this case.

Sincerely,

T.M.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Confere nee

.invrtmt a+omt of tqt 'J!lttittb ~tatts:
'~lhts:Jringhttt. ~.

at·

ZLlgi'!-~

CHAMI!IERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

November 2, 1972

Re:

No. 72-936 - United States v. Robinson

Dear Bill:
I agree with your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference

.;.

.hprttttt <!fltltrl ltf tlrt ~nUt~ ~hdtg
._,ultittgtcn. ~. <q. 2llc?'!'
CHAM!SERS 0,.

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Nove_:g1ber 5, 1973

Re: No. 72-936

-

U.S. v. Robinson

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

jl.(/..
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: The Conference

;1

/

U·

To:

)JOV,/-'

Mr. Justice Powell

From: JCJjr
Re :. '

No. 72-936, United States v. Robinson
This memorandum details some of the points you may wish

to keep in mind in reviewing Mr. Justice Rehnquist's draft
opinion in this case.

In light of the thoroughness of our

previous discussions and of the substantial coincidence of our
views on this subject, I will not review all the aspects of the
argument which I might have forumlated differently from Mr.
Justice Rehnquist.
Part I is satisfactory as written .
Part II also seems to me quite acceptable, though I have
one minor quibble with the first sentence.

In fairness to Judge

Wright and the others who adopt his view, I think it appropriate
to point out that he considers a full field search incident to
a lawful custodial arrest unacceptable only for a crime not
involving evidence likely to be concealed on the person of the
arrestee.

Traffic offenses are the most common examples, but,

as you know, there are others.

Justice Rehnquist recognizes

this aspect of Wright's position elsewhere in his opinion.

I

think it should be expressly stated here for the sakeof clarity.
In
quibble.

~art

III I begin to run into trouble.

First, another

I do not see the point of foausing, as he does mid-way

through the first paragraph, on what was "recognized in cases
decided prior to Weeks."

In this area, I would not suppose that

precedents of that vintage would have any special authority.
Indeed, I would be inclined to think the contrary.

This paragraph

- 2 -

introduces a series of cases that do not seem# materially to
strengthen the Court's view.

The quote from Dillon v. O'Brien

concerns the destruction of evidence, while the excerpt from
Closson v. Morrison only justifies a weapons search.

As you

well know, Judge Wright conceded the propriety of a weapons
frisk for any custodial arrest and specifically limited his
reasoning to .cases not involving evidence or fruits likely to
be found on the person of the arrestee.

I therefore view

these authorities as inapposite here.
The quote from Cardozo on page 13 seems to me strong and
directly on point, but the immediately preceding excerpt from
Holker v. Hennessey seems to me to damage the cause.

That

quote identifies three rationales for search incident to arresta
evidence of the crime charged, identification of the suspect, and
preventioq of an escape (weapons).

I believe that our previous

discussions reveal that a careful and narrow construction of
these three interests does not justify the search in this case.
-

·-

-N~-

l ~

-

The same comment is relevant to the ~e~ond pa~agrap~
of Cardozo )r~..J,
.,...,..,.,........
,...-....,.~--

on page 14.

....

The search here upheld was broader than a weapons

search under Terry.

_ --

-

II

The first sentence of the last
- · paragraph.... on page 14 is ~vw
'

inaccurate.
a searchr

.

The Cout of Appeals recognized two rationales for
discovery of evidence and the removal of weapons. '

Its opinion was excellently fashioned to provide a narrow, case-bycase limitation of the search to those r eationales.

This statement

seems to me misleading.
This characterization of the Wright position leads into
the discussion on pages 15-16 of the draft.

!read Justice Rehnquist

- 3 -

as impliedly embracing Judge Wilkey's argument that the patdown
allowed by Judge Wright would be insufficent to uncover all
dangerous weapons.

As I have mentioned to you before, I find

that unpersuasive and believe it is a weak ground on which to
base this opinion.

If the only rationale for this search was

to diecover weapons, then the policeman should have stopped
when he found the crumpled cigarecte pack unless he formed the
belief that the material inside ..:-was of such a shape and character
that it might be a weapon.
I find the more general discussion beginning on page 16
very much to the point.
The only other comment I have is that you might consider
the wisdom of making some reference to the difficulty of confining
Judge Wright's reasoning to traffic offenses . and to the fact that
a full field search incident to a custodial arrest almost always
duplicates a pre-detention inventory search.

-

that

Jus~&ce

-

_..-

-

It seems to me

Rehnquist would strengthen the argument begun

mid-say on page 16 by some reference to these points.
Of course, I shall be happy to discuss these observations
with you and to draft any concurrence you may desire.
JCJjr

-

.......

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: November 7, 1973

No. 72-936 United states v. Robinson
I intend to join your opinion, but I wish to make three suggestions
for your consideration.
1. I believe that the opinion would be strengthened by an explicit
statement of a proposition that I find implicit throughout your argument,
namely, that a person lawfully subjected to custodial arrest retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. In
the paragraph beginning on page 16, you reject the idea "that there must
be litigated in each ease the issue of whether or not there was present

one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person
incident to arrest." The concluding sentence of his discussion states
what I believe to be the core of the opinion:
"It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is
not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search
under that Amendment."
I fully agree with this statement, It impliedly recognizes the proper role
of the Fourth Amendment - to prevent unwarranted governmental intrusions
into areas of an individual's life about which he entertains legitimate

2.
expectations of privacy. Whatever the ancillary consequences of this
eanstttutional guarantee, its purpose is not to allow those who have
committed crimes to go undetected, but rather to shield innocent citizens
from unjustifiable invasions of privacy in the name of law enforcement.
I •tew the custodial arrest as the significant intrusion of sUite power
into the realm of individual affairs normally termed private. Assuming
that the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth
Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental
Jnterest. At that point the arrestee retains no signifiCant interest in the
privacy of his person. No reason exists to hamper law enforcement by
requiring some independent justification for a search incident to a lawful
arrest. This seems to me the reason that the fact of lawful arrest
even

justifies a full search of the person/if that search is not narrowly limited
to seizing evidence or disarming the arrestee. In other words, the search
incident to lawful arrest is necessarily reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional
guarantee is substantially and legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.
If you agree that this is the essential premise underlying your opinion,

perhaps you can emphasize it along the foregoing lines. I think the
opinion would be strengthened 1f this were expressly stated.
2. The quotation from Hulker v. Hennessey on page 13 unnecessarily
detracts from the strength of your argument. I read the quotation as

identifying three rationales for a search incident to arrest, none of which
is present in this case. To the extent that some may assume that the
three stated reasons are exclusive, the quotation may undercut somewhat
the force of your reasoning elsewhere in the opinion.

3. Finally, I point out what to me at least ls a potential ambiguity.
The first sentence of the last paragraph on page 14 and the first sentence
of the next paragraph might leave the impression that the Court of Appeals
plurality failed to recognize the police officer's legitimate need to disarm
an.a.rrestee. I believe your description of Judge Wright's reasoning is
entirely accurate, but some potential for confusion exists. Perhaps the
difficulty could be avoided by italicizing the word "full" near the bottom
of page 14.

•***
I hope these suggestions wUl not add to your burdens.

You have

a court in sight, but I do not think the foregoing would reduce your
constituency.
L. F. P., Jr.

ss

;%uprtmt <If~ ~f tfrt ,-mttb ;%bdtg

ji'u!p:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2ll~'!6J
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 8, 1973

Re:

No. 72-936 - United States v. Robinson

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your suggestions about the draft opinion.
I think that some language such as you suggest in the first
paragraph of your note would strengthen the opinion, and I
propose to include some along the lines described later in
this note; the quotation from Hennessey may not be ideal, but
I think it does serve the purpose of shedding some light about
how courts viewed this proposition during the last century;
there just aren't too many cases to choose from.
I think
your suggestion in the third paragraph is a very happy one,
and I incorporate it as made.
1. I agree with the observations contained in your
first paragraph, but would prefer to have the language
actually added to the opinion take a somewhat narrower tack.
I am frankly skeptical of generalized summaries of the
meaning of constitutional provisions which, while considered
in the context of the case make perfectly good sense and are
undoubtedly correct, can be taken out of context in some
later litigation and urged to stand for a quite different
proposition than they were intended to speak. If a more
modest reprise of your paragraph 1 is acceptable, I would
propose the following language to be inserted immediately
before the last sentence in Part III of the opinion:

- 2 -

"A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
having taken place, a search incident to
the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest
. .

. etc.

11

I am probably obligated to circulate this sentence to
those who have already joined the opinion, ·and will be happy
to do so if it sufficiently advances your purpose.
My reaction to your paragraphs (2) and (3) are pretty
well spelled out in the earlier part of this note.
Sincerely

!Jill'

P.S. I have offered a clerkship to Bill Jacobs, whom you
recommended and by whom I was very much impressed in the
personal interview. WHR

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
K OS. 72- 936
United States, Petitioner,
72-936
v.
Willie Robinson. Jr.
.•.

James E. Gustafson.
Petitioner,
71- 1669
V.
State of Florida..

AND

71- 1669

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.

On \Yrit of Certiorari to the
) Rupreme Court of Florida.

[November -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL. concurring.
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential
premise of our decisions.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of "the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.... "
These are areas of an individual's life about which he
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law
enforcement by requiring some independent justification
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full
search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly

72-936 & 71-1669-CONCUR
2

UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON

limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and
disarming the arrestee. 1 The search incident to arrest
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 2

1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this
rationale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960):
"Power over the body of the accused is the essence of his arrest;
the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging UJ10n the
sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to
ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever
the arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension.
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical
dominion of the law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose,
cannot be deemed unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetration." [Citations omitted.]
2 In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the custodial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in
Robinson. Gustafson would haYe presented a different question if
the petitioner could haYe proved that he was taken into custody
only to a.fford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collatoral objectives. But no such question is before us.
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[November -, 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential
premise of our decisions.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of "the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "
These are areas of an individual's life about which he
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law
enforcement by requiring some independent justification
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full
search of the person, even if that search is not narrowly

72-936 & 71-1669-CONCUR
2

UNITED STATES v. IWRIKSON

limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and
disarming the arrestee. 1 The search jncjdent to arrest
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 2

1 The Court of Appl'als for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this
rationale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960):
"Power ovl'r the body of the accused is the e:,;sence of his arrest;
the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may curtail
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging upon the·
sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to
ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody must of necessity be asserted initia.lly over whatever
the arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension.
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physicaf
dominion of the law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose,
cannot be deemed unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetration." [Citations omitted.]
2
In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the cu~
todial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in
Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a different question if
the petitioner could have proved that he was taken into custody
only to afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral objectives. But no such question is before us.
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72-936 United states v. Robinson
71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinions in the above cases.
As we discussed, I will circulate a brief concurrence which
wlll net in any way be incompatible with what you have written.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

cc: The Conference
.,,

--

.iUFtmt (!fo:urlltf tltt~lt~ .§hdtil
~ufringhtn. to. <q:. 2llp>t~
CHAMBERS OF

November 29, 1973

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re: No. 72-936 - U. S. v. Robinson

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

~u.pwnc ~cnrt cf

'W~'h'ltingiott.

tire ):1ttttd~ ,§tntl's

p.

~· 2llb}J~2

CHAMBER S OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

December 5, 1973

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your dissent in

72-936, u.s. v. Robinson.
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December 6, 1973

RE: No. 72-936 United States v. Robinson
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me in your dissenting
opinion in the above.

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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Petitioner,
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State of Florida.

On \Vrit of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Florida.

[December 11 , 1973]

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write
briefly to emphasize what seems to me to be the essential
premise of our decisions.
The Fourth Amendment safcguarus the right of "the
people to be secure in their persons. houses. papers, and
effects. against unreasonable searches and seizures .... "
These are areas of an individual's life about which he
entertains legitimate expectations of privacy. I believe
that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest
retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person. Under this view the custodial
arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the
privacy of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the
privacy interest guarded by the Fourth Amendment is
subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate law
enforcement by requiring some independent justification
for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This
seems to me the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full
search of the person , even if that search is not narrowly

72-936 & 71-1669-CONCUR
2
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limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and
disarming the arrestee. 1 The search incident to arrest
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest. 2

1 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this
rn.tionale in Charles v. United States, 278 F. 2d 386, 388-389 (1960):
"Power over the body of the accused is the e;;;;ence of his arrest;
the two cannot be separnted. To say that the police may curtail
the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging up!'ln the
sanctity of his pocket;; except for enumerated reasons is to
ignore the cu::itodial dutie;; which devolve upon arrcHting authorities. Custody muHt of neees:>ity be asserted initially over whateYer
the arrested party h:ts in his possession at the time of apprehension.
Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical
dominion of the law, inspections of his per~on, regardless of purpose,
cannot be deemed unlnwful, unless they violate the dictates of
reason either because of their number of their manner of perpetration." [Citations omitted.]
2
In Gustafson, the petitioner conceded the validity of the custodial arrest, although that conclusion was not as self-evident as in
Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a different question if
the petitioner could have proved that he was taken into custody
only to afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral objectives. But no such question is before us.
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No. 72-936
United States v. Robinson

This is the SG's cert petn in a case that we have
been waiting for ••

Recall that several months ago we had

a case styled Gustafson v. Florida, in which two college
boys were stopped, arrested, and given a full body search

--

during which two marijuana cigarettes were discovered in
a cigarette package.

That case is presently being held

for Robinson.
I worked on this case for Judge McGowan.

We wrote

the initial remand order sendning the case back to the DC
to develop facts on the question whether officers need a

I

full body search to protect themselves when they are taking
a person into custody.

------ ----·- -

The CA's conclusion after the

came back up was that no such intrisu~e

c~se

search was necessary

to protect the legitimate interests of the police.
The SG chatHllenges that conclusio n.

-

He also

sugges~s

that the Ct should take the cue from the ALI and adopt a

--2--

case-by-case appraoch to the exclusionary rule, throwing

-

"----·

-

......

'

...

out probative evidence only when the facts are outrageous.
This is the English

--

~odel;

it has been recently rejected

by the ABA, although the ALI approves of it (as does CA
\vright).
I think both questions are important.

I would grant

the case to consider (1) whether the search incident to
a custodial arrest may be broader than a Terry pa.tdown,
and (2) whether the exclusionary should be reshaped.
NOTE:

If the case is taken it will immediately become one

of the major cases for next Term, since it would pose the
most fougdational questions for the future of the exclusionary rule.

Therefore, I suggest that this case be singled

out for a special research project this summer by one of the
new cleirks.
GRANT

"!!."•'

LAH
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PRELIMINARY MEMO
March 2, 1973
List 1, Sheet 2, Page 2
Cert to CA D. C. (en bane)
(Wright, McGowan, Leventhal,
Robinson; Bazelon, concurring;
Wilkey, Tamm, MacKinnon,
Robb, dissenting)

No. 72-936-CFY
UNITED STATES

v.
ROBINSON
1.

counts .

Federal-Criminal

Timely

Resp was convicted in the USDC D. C. (Jones) on two heroin

DG

CA. (Wright, Leventhal; Wilkey dissenting) reversed on grounds

that the heroin had been taken in an unreasonable search of resp incident

-

to a traffic offense arrest.

The CA en bane vacated the decision and

remanded for further fact-finding.
\'- ·.>'
'<...,,.;.

Then the CA sustained the original

panel's reversal of the conviction in a 5-4 .decision.

Petr contends that the

heroin evidence was taken in a lawful search incident to resp' s arrest.

- 2 -

2.

FACTS:

On April 19, 1968, Officer Jencks stopped resp in ...a

car for a "routine traffic check.

11

The officer noted that resp' s driver's

license and draft card showed different dates of birth.

Resp was allowed

to go free, but the officer checked resp' s driving records.

He discovered

that a license issued in resp' s name had been revoked but that a temporary
driving permit had been taken out later in resp' s name under a different
date of birth.

In D. C. driving after revocation of a driving permit is

punishable by a mandatory minimum jail term of 30 days, with a maximum
of one year.

D. C. Police Dept. regulations require officers to conduct a "full

officer.
\

Summary arrest of the violator is required of the apprehending

field search" in making any "full custody" arrest.
On April 23 Officer Jencks observed resp driving with

-

companions.

~o

Resp was asked to show his temporary license again, and

upon compliance Jencks told him he was under arrest.
search with a pat down of resp' s chest area.

Jencks began his

He felt an object, but

could not tell"anything aboutho.vhard the object was or how soft it was,"
·nor could he tell its size.

-

Jencks then reached into resp' s breast pocket

and removed what turned out to be a crumpled up cigarette packaye.

He

could feel "objects" in the package but could not tell what they were.

He

opened the package and found 14 gelatin capsules of white powder, whi'\h
proved to be heroin.

Officer Jencks then completed his search, including

feeling around resp' s waist and trouser legs and examining the remaining
pockets.

- 3 The CA en bane held the search unreasonable.

Both the majority

and minority judges agreed that the only permissible purpose for a search
incident to arrest for a traffic offense (though serious, as here) is for
police protection.

It was also conceded by all that Officer Jencks exceeded

the scope of a limited Terry v. Ohio frisk for weapons.

(Terry involved

the search of a suspect where there was no probable cause to arrest.)
Officer Jencks did not indicate at trial that he believed the object he felt
under resp' s coat to be a weapon:
about what I was looking for.

"I just searched him.

I just searched him."

I didn't think

The disputed issue

was the permissible extent of a search for weapons under the circumstances
.J

here involved.
The majority relies on Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
There defendant was arrested by an off-duty policeman who suspected him
of attempting to burglarize an apartment.

The arrest was upheld.

The

subsequent pat-down search followed by the removal of an object from
defendant's pocket that felt like a knife but turned out to be burglar tools was
reasonable.

But the Court added:

"Moreover, it [the search] was

reasonably limited in scope by these purposes.

Officer Lasky did not

engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing examination of Peters and his
personal effects." At 67.
The majority holds that the police are limited to a frisk search
when arresting for traffic offenses.

.----

A Terry frisk is capable of locating

virtually every type of concealed weapon.
\~

Conceding that there will always

be the "long shot case" where a frisk will not reveal a novel weapon, the

- 4 arrestee's right to privacy outweighs this slight risk.

Furthermore, it

is not just a question of delaying a search that will have to be made at the
station house.

The CA D. C. has held that where one is arrested for a traffic

offense and has a right to put up collateral or make bail, the police may
not search the arrestee until he has h9-d an opportunity to secure his lawful
· release.
Judge Wilkey, for the dissenting judges, disputes that resp' s
arrest did not justify a full search for protection.

Here the arresting

officer was following standard regulations promulgated on the basis of
experience with a great number of arrests.

Individual rights are more

likely to be protected if the police follow such reasonable regulations than

-

if they are forced to make ad hoc judgments on the proper type of search
to fit each specific situation.

The offense here, driving after revocation

of one ' s permit, does not hold the same possibilities for pretextual arrest

-

as do offenses like speeding, which do not necessitate an arrest, may be.
The danger to the policeman who must arrest a suspect and transport him
to the police station is significantly greater than in stop-and-frisk situations:
especially the danger from small weapons effective at close range increases.
Many such small concealed weapons may not be discovered in a pat-down
search.

Furthermore, the fact that Officer Jencks looked into the

cigarette package, instead of merely retaining it in his possession, is
~lerh<-\.
also justified; the presence of a weapon would have a1tQr8d the officer to t h e

greater danger that the arrestee would have other concealed weapons .

- 5 Judge Wilkey also argues that the search here was less intrusive than the
search authorized by Terry.

(Feeling with "sensitive fingers" every

portion of the suspect's body).
3.

-

arrest

CONTENTIONS:

The SG emphasizes the dangers of a custodial

as opposed to a stop-- regardless of the suspected offense.

The majority struck an improper balance between police safety and the
right of a person arrested on probable cause to his privacy.

Officer

Jencks was following reasonable police regulations, standardized procedures important in controlling police conduct.

It is important, therefore,

-to take a broad view of the reasonableness of such regulations.

The

majority below places too much weight on the fact that Jencks subjectively
had no specific thought that the cigarette package was a weapon.
(Presumably if he had so thought, he could have at least removed it to
see what it was.) Finally, even if the search was illegal, the exclusionary
rule should not be extended here.

The A. L. I. 1 s balancing approach to

deciding whether to invoke the exclusionary rule in a particular situation
is set out.
Resp notes that the decision below will affect few cases.

Traffic

offenses are about the only offense where the officer has no right to search
for evidence incident to an arrest.

The risk that an arresting officer might

be injured by a concealed weapon that could not be dis covered in a proper
Terry frisk is minimal.

In this case there was no reason whatsoever for

the arresting officer to believe resp has committed any offense other than

- 6 the traffic violation or that he had any weapons.

The real purpose of the

"full field search" in this situation has been to the discovery of evidence
of unrelated crimes.

A Terry frisk is fully adequate to protect the

arresting officer in this situation.
4.

DISCUSSION: The is sue here seems reasonably important

and has not been settled by this Court.

The CA cites numerous decisions

of other courts supporting its result, but the gov't distinguishes these as
involving vehicle searches, stops (as opposed to arrests), optional arrests
(as opposed to mandatory arrests, as was the case here.), and arrests
for offenses carrying no imprisonment.

Given the difficulty of the issue

involved, its intimate connection with past decisions of this Court, and the
particular facts of the case, I believe the case is clearly certworthy.
There is a response.
Reavley

2/21/73
DK
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No. 64

Senate
REPORT ON WIRETAPPING AND
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, courtordered wiretapping and electronic surveillance authorized by title m of the
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968" is playing a key role
in the war against crime. As the Attorney General testified on April 5 before
the Senate Committee on Appropriations:
The provision for •.• (wiretapping) by
Congress bas been the most significant, most
Important weapon that our country has bad
to deal effectively with the problem of organized crime.••• Now after four and a half
yoors we have more than one-half or the
leadership of organized crime In the country under Indictment.

His testimony was also underscored ::,y
that of the Assistant Attorney General
for Narcotics:
I would say wiretapping Is one of the principal tools needed and necessary to develop
major conspiracy . . . cases. It Is expensive.
It is time-consuming. It Is very tedious Investigative work. It takes an awful lot of
manpower to operate taps and surveillance
devices. But it Is an absolutely effective and
necessary tool.

Mr. President, during 1972, there were
855 orders for intercepts issued by.Federal and State judges, and 2,861 arrests
fiowed from the information obtained.
So far, 402 convictions have already resulted, and more are expected. This is
compelling evidence of the effectiveness
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance in combating organized crime.
In order to protect the public and keep
it informed, title m of the act provides
that prosecutors who seek surveillance
orders and judges who issue them are required to file detailed reports each year
to the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. The Administrator is required to
transmit to Congress a summary and
analysis of this information.
These public disclosure provisions refiect the judgment of Congress that complete and regular public accounting is
essential to any system requiring the use
of electronic surveillance techniques--no
matter how limited its use. Public support for the power to wiretap and bugeven under authorization--<:an only be
obtained where the citizenry is responsibly informed as to the extent and character of its use.

The Fifth Annual Surveillance report
which has just been released by the
Director of the Administrative Office indicates that eighteen of the 21 jurisdictions which have laws authorizing
courts to issue surveillance ordered used
their statutes in 1972.
In these 18 jurisdictions, Federal judges
signed 206 orders for intercepts and
649 were signed by State judges. Of the
649 State orders, 294 or 45 percent were
issued in New York, while 235 or 36 percent were issued in New Jersey.
.
The 855 applications filed during 1972
compares with 596 applications filed in
1970. On the Federal level, the decrease
from- 285 in 1971 to 206 in 1972 results
from a shift in emphasis by the Department of Justice from gambling to narcotics and other offenses. In narcotics cases,
it is usually more difficult to establish the
probable cause required to authorize the
tap. ·
In 1971 and 1972, the Justice Department mounted an extraordinary effort to
deal with syndicated gambling, relying
principly on electronic surveillance. In
1971, 251 of its 285 applications were in
the gambling field. Only 22 were for narcotics. In contrast, 146 of its 1972 orders
were for gambling, while the narcotic figure rose to 35.
During 1971-72, 8 known or suspected
organized crime figures were convicted,
including the head of the New Jersey
syndicate and high ranking members of
the Genovese-New York and Detroit syndicates. Twenty-eight more such figures,
including the heads of the Brooklyn,
Kansas City and Florida syndicates, and
two high-ranking members of the Cleveland syndicates were indicted.
Mr. President, I am hopeful that the
shift in emphasis to narcotics cases will
now carry with it a similar record of achievement.
On the State level, the rise in surveillance orders from 531 in 1971 to 649 in
1972 represents an increasing pattern of
utilization of State statutes authorizing
surveillance by States other than New
York and New Jersey. I am confident
that when all of the States begin to use
the authority concurred by the 1968 act,
they, too, will have a record of success in
combating crime through the use of
electronic surveillance techniques.
On the Federal level, of 206 authorized intercepts, 205 were installed and 48
extensions were granted. The 205 au-

thorizations were granted for an average
length of 16 days; the extensions were
granted for an average of 15 days. The
State picture varied. In New Jersey, for
example, of the 68 authorized intercepts
of the Attorney General's Office, 67 were
installed and 13 extensions were granted.
The 67 authorizations were granted for
an average length of 18 days; the extensions for 21 days.
Of the 841 devices installed in 1972 on
the Federal and State level, 779 involved
a telephone wiretap. Twenty-nine applications si>eCified a microphone device,
and 28 requests specified both a telephone tap and a microphone.
The offenses specified in the 841 applications covered a wide range of criminal activity, but several broad categories
of crime predominated: gambling 497;
narcotics 230; homicide and assault 35;
larceny 22; loan sharking 13; and receiving stolen property 31.
In 1972 the average intercept involved
51 persons and 600 intercepts, of which
303 or 50.5 percent were incriminating.
In contrast, in 1971 the average wiretap
involved 40 persons and 643 intercepts,
of which 399 or 60 percent were incriminating. In Federal cases during 1972, the
average intercept involved 66 persons
and 1,023 intercepts, of which 614 or
60 percent were incriminating. In 1971
the average intercept involved 53 persons and 916 intercepts, of which 648 or
71 percent were incriminating.
The increase in the number of persons
involved in surveillance and corresponding decrease in the percentage of incriminating intercepts is attributable to the
shifting character of the offenses under
surveillance. In 1971, gambling led the
list with 570 ordered; while in 1972 the
gambling figure dropped to 497. In 1971,
there were only 126 narcotics cases. In
1972, the narcotic's figure had increased
to 230. Experience has shown that it is
relatively easier to focus on incriminating telephone calls in the gambling area,
while in the narcotics field, it is necessary to conduct surveillance over an increased number of conversations to obtain incriminating evidence.
Nevertheless, to show the extraordinarily limited character of even this surveillance, statistics furnished by the
~mertcan Telephone & Telegraph Co. to
the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures, which I am privileged to
chair, show that there are approximately

2.
119 miH1on telephones. including exten'ns, in the United States and that they
J used to make more than 159 billion
calls each year. The percentage of calls,
therefore, subject to surveillance in 1972
is almost too small to calculate. It is less
than .0000039 percen t . The privacy of
the average citizen, in short, is not
threatened by the court ordered surveillance authorized by title m .
Indeed, the 1968 act prohibits wiretapping not authorized by the courts.
And these provisions, too, have been ·
used with significant effect.
The first conviction obtained under
title m, for example, was that of Enid
Roth, an NBC program director, who
pleaded nolo contendere to a count alleging illegal interception of proceedings of
the platform committee of the National
Democratic Party during the 1968 convention by means of a microphone concealed behind a curtain in a conference
room. The most important case yet developed under the 1968 act, however, has
been the Watergate affair. The investigation, prosecutions, and convictions in
this case were all made possible by the
1968 act. Without it; we would not have
had available on the books a Federal
felony punishable by 5 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine (18 U.S.C.
2511>. As tragic and regrettable as this
whole affair has been, I a.m glad that
the 1968 act could be used to bring these
men to justice. The Senate can know that it did its part in ·strengthening this aspect of the law, too.
The total cost of each intercept-manpower and equipment-ranged from a
low of $5 to a high of $82,628, with the
average intercept nationally running
$5,435, and the average Federal intercept
running $9,795. The figures should do a
great deal to relieve the fears of some
citizens of an excessive use of these techniques by legitimate law-enforcement
agents. Most police departments, including the Federal law-enforcement agencies, simply do not have the manpower
and other resources to conduct widespread or indiscriminate surveillance.
Most of the cases in which there were
intercepts reported are, of course, still
under investigation or are awaiting trial.
Indeed, the studies of the Subcommittee
on Criminal Laws and Procedures indicate that the average delay from indictment to trial in organized crime cases is
22 .5 months. Consequently, conviction results will always lag behind arrests.
Nevertheless, the 1972 annual report, as
I have said, indicates that as of December
31, 1972, 2,861 arrests had resulted from
intercepts made during last year. In addition, 402 convictions have been obtained.
Recognizing that arrests and convictions would lag behind surveillance, title
liT required supplementary reports to be
filed on the results of past year's surveillance. According to these supplementary
reports, during 1972, there were 732 arrests and 1,193 convictions as a result of
intercepts installed in previous years.
Taken together with the data from previous annual reports, this indicates from
June 1968 to December 1972, there have

been 2,742 orders which have yielded
6,956 arrests, and 2,495 convictions.
These are indeed impressive figures, and
certainly should put to rest any suggestion that wiretapping is ineffective in
combating crime.
Mr. President, to gain a sense of the
concrete results of electronic surveillance, it may be helpful to look at the
facts of several cases in which intercepts
brought otherwise elusive lawbreakers
to justice.
On June 1, 1971, a Federal jury found
Martin and Jesse Sklaroff guilty of
transmission of gambling information.
This was the first Federal wiretap under title m. It was in operation 6 days.-171 conversations were involved, of
which 161 were incriminating-94 percent. The telephone was in a public booth
in the Miami International Airport; visual surveillance was maintained on the
booth, so that the tap was in operation
only when the suspect entered the booth.
When Sklaroff, one of the Nation's leading layoff men-the underworld figure
who relnsures bets-was convicted, he
told the Atlanta Journal on June 1, 1971:
You can't work with a telephone-I'm

gonna have to find another business. The
Federal wiretaps are going to put us au out

of business.

The case Is now on appeal in the Fifth
Circuit.
On October 13, 1971, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided United. States
v. Cox. 449 F. 2d 679 <lOth ctr. 1971),
cert. d.enfed, 406 U.S. 934 (1972), in
which it sustained the constitutionality
of title m and a:lllrmed the conviction
in the appeal before it.
The case involved four bank robbers
whose conversations were overheard
during the course of a wiretap issued in
a narcotics investigation. The wiretap
was installed for 19 days on a residential
telephone; 1,216 intercepts were involved, of which 157 were incrimtnating-12 percent. This one wp-etap has
resulted in 19 convictions: n for narcotics, four for bank robbery, and one
for assault on a Federal narcotics agent.
In q.ddition to uncovering the scope of
the narcotics ring and solving the bank
·robbery, the officers were able to prevent
a murder with information overheard on
the tap.
Finally, when Cox's narcotics conviction was appealed, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.in United. States v. Cox,
462 F. 2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972), followed
the lead ot: the Tenth Circll.it and sustained the constitutionality of title m
and aftirmed that conviction, too.
Indeed, only one district court to date
has upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of the various provisions of
title m. In United. States v. Whitaker,
343 F . Supp. 358 <E.D. Pa. 1972>, Judge
Joseph Lord m held title m unconstitutional. I am pleased to report, however,
that his decision was reversed by the
Third Circuit on February 27, 1973.
More recently, on April 5, 1973, in
United States against Tortorello, the
Second Court of Appeals sustained both
the constitutionality of title m and a
New York State statute modeled on
title m, in aftirming the stock fraud conviction of Arthur Tortorello.
Tortorello's criminal record began in

1929-more than four decades ago. A
member of the Gambino syndicate in
New York City, he collected arrests
ranging from burglary, assault and battery, and forgery to a 1-year SCI'tence
for kidnaping. The New York County
District Attorney's Office obtained in
1969 a series of wiretap and surveillance
orders m connection with an investigation of stolen property and forged instruments. The execution of the orders
uncovered a complex fraudulent scheme
in which Tortorello conspired to dispose
of thousands of unregistered and worthless stock to the unsuspecting public.
Tortorello has now been convicted and
sentenced to 5 years in jail and a $10,000
fine. As in the Sklaroff and Cox cases,
the indispensable key to his conviction
was the surveillance orders authorized
by titlem.
Mr. President, I am proud to have been
associated with the effort that led to the
enactment of title m of the 1968 act.
I am pleased, too, that the effort of the
Senate to strengthen law enforcement
with this necessary tool has met and
passed its constitutional tests in the
courts. It vindicates, I thJnk, the Senate's
judgment to include title m in the 1968
act.
Mr. President, I ask unanimons consent that the following exhibits appear
in the REcoRD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
Exhibit No. 1, jurisdictions with statutes authorizing the interception of wire
or oral communications, January 1, 1972,
to December 31, 1972.
Exhibit No. 2, court-authorized Fed·
eral electronic surveillance.
Exhibit No. 3, summary report on au·
thorized intercepts granted.
Exhibit No. 4, known or suspected organized crime figures prosecuted under
Federal antigambling laws.
Exhibit No. 5, gambling operations indicted by Organized Crime and Racketeering Section during fiscal year 1971.
Exhibit No. 6, conviction of persons
involved in major gambling rings, fiscal
year 1972.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
EXHIBIT I.-JURISDICTIONS WITH STATUTES AUTHORIZ·
lNG THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNI·
CATIONS EFFECTIVE DURING THE PERIOD JAN, 1, 1972
TO DEC. 31, 1972
Reported
use of
State

Statutory citation •

~i~~~~

FederaL _____ ___ 18:2510 to 2520 _______ ___ ___ Yes.
Arizona __________ 13:105lto 13:1059 _____ : ____ Yes.
C~lorado _________ 4tl-4--26 to 46-4- 33 __ __ ______ Yes,
ConnecticuL ___ __ Public Act No. 68.., ______ ___ Yes.
Delaware __ ______ 11 :XLII.757 __: ________ ____ .. Yes.
Florida __ ________ 934.01 to 934.10 ___ ___ ____ ___ Yes.
Georgia __________ 26-3001to 26-3010__ ________ Yes.
Kansas ___ ______ _ 22- 2513___ ___ _·--·-·-· ----- Yes.
Maryland ___ _____ 3!>-92 to 35-99___ ____ __ _____ Yes.
Massachusetts____ 272-99____ _______ ____ _____ _ Yes.
Minnesota _______ 626A.O) to 626A.23 ___ ___ ,,_ Yes.
Nebraska ____ __ __ 86- 701 to 86-707 __ ______ __ __ Yes.
Nevada. __ __ __ ___ 200.6l0 to 200.690_______ ____ Yes.
New Hampshire __ 570- A:1 to 57o-A :ll ______ ___ No.
New Jersey_, __ _ 2A:156A-1 to 2A :156A- 26 __., Yes.
New York __ __ ___ , 813-J to 813-M; 814to 825 ___ Yes.
Oregon ___ _______ 141.720 to 141.900___ ____ __ __ Yes.
Rhode Island ___ __ 12- 5.1- 1 to 12-5.1- 16 ____ ____ Yes.
South Dakota _____ 23- 13A- llo 23- 13A- Il ___ __ _ No. Washington ______ 9.73.030 to 9.73.080; __ ___ ____ No.
Wisconsin _____ ___ 968.27 to 968.33 ____ _____ ____ Yes.
• Excludes jurisdictions which enacted legislation in 1973.

..
3.

-889 court orders have been obtained and executed are as follows:

EXHIBlT 2

C011.rt Authorized Federal Electronic
Surveillance

During the years 1969 through April 24,
1973, a total of 889 court orders (Including
183 extensions) have been obtained and executed in connection wit h Federal Investigat ions.
The categories of offenses In which the

CJa01bling ---- - --- --- - -------- - -- ----- 653
Narcotics -----------------, - --------- 152
Extortionate Credit Transactions_______ 38
Counterfeiting ------------------ ----- 12
Interstate Transportation of Stolen
Property --------------------------- 15
Bribery ------------------------- - ---5

Theft and Robbery _____ _____ _____ ____ _
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations - ~-- ---------- ---- - - -Obstruction of Justice __________ __ ____ _

3

6
2

Kldnappl.ng -- - --- ------ ----------- -- Interstate Transportation of Explosives_
Interference with Commerce_____ _____ _
Total

1

1
1

889

EXHIBIT NO. 3
SUMMARY REPORT ON AUTHORIZED INTERCEPTS GRANTED PURSUANT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE. SECTION 2518 JUNE 20-DEC. 31. 1958, JAN. I DEC. 31, 1969 THROUGH 1972
Reporting period
Summary item 1

1968

Intercept applications authorized. ___.. _
17(
Feder.ll. --------------------- ___ -- --- .. . _.
17(
State...•. ----------- ---. ___ ----Average length of original authori20
zation (days>----- -------------Number of extensions___ __ ________
128
Average length of extensions
(days) _______ ------------20
location of authorized intercept :
Residence. ____. __ ___ _______ _
67
49
Apartment. ..• ------------ ___
Multrple dwelling __ __ _________
10
Business __ _------ ___________

1969
301

1970

Reporting period
1971

1972

596
182
414

816
285
531

855

268
23
200

22
237

22
228

22
246

21

20

24

24

33

45

Business and living quarters.•.. . ------ ·- .
Nolindicatedorother____ _____
3
Major offenses specified in applicalion :
Arson and explosives ___ ______
I
5
Bribery_- - -- -- - ------------Drugs.• ____ _______ .-------·_
71
Extortion (includes usury and
13
loansharking)
. .••. •._______
... -.--_
Gambling
____________
20
22
Homicide and assault. ..•.••• •
19
l.arceny_--- --- --- -- ------ ---

134
68
14
71
5
9

203
163
39
121
30
40

3(2
211
45
134
40

206

649

Summary item 1

1

89

13
16
127

2
16
126

2
9
230

10
102
19
10

17
325
21
31

5
570
18
31

13
497
35
22

1See reverse side lor minor revisions of previously published data.
·
• Installed intercepts includes only those inten:epts where a report was received from a prosecuting attorney.

1970

1971

1972
9
38
841
205
638

Al~:~~eJ.~~-~~--~~-~~~~-

Average number of inten:epted
communications__~ ________ _
Average number of incriminating intercepted communica-

15.561

29

53

«

40

51

454

544

656.

643

600

265

296

399

303

262

569

716

805

$2,634

$5,534

$4,599

$5,435

127
45
54
24
12

178

241
163
162
114
96

206
156
185
124
134

lions _~-~- __ ____ --- - -- _____
98
Number of authorizations whore
cost reported __ __ ______________
120
Average cost where cost reported. ____ __ __------ ---- - $1,358
Number of orders costing:
$1,000 or less __ ____ ____ ______
75
$1,001to $2.000. •• •. •• ••••.••
21
$2.001to ss.ooo ____ ______ ____
18
$5,001to $10.000___ ___ _____ __
6
$10,001 and over__ __ __ __ ___ ______ ______

62

1
11

1969

Robbery___ . _______ ___ ____ .• _
8
24
13
11
other_•. ___ ___ __ _----- - _____
15
35
33
31
Intercept applications installed•_ - ----147
270
582
792
30
179
Federal. __. __------------- --------- ---- __ _
281
147
240
State___.. ---.--- -- ------------403
511
For authorized intercepts inSialled:
Actual number of days in use ..•
•NA 9, 018.0 11.190.5 14.582.5

351
218
56
120
48

44

1968

88

139
88

76

' NA-Not available.

EXHIBIT 4
KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES PROSECUTED UNDER FEDERAL ANTIGAMBLING LAWS, 1971- 721
District

Name

Comments

Indictments, 1971:
Michael Astarita •.• - -- ------- - ------ - D.N.L ..•.•
Gaetano Musto •--- --- --- ------ -------- ·---- -- - -- Arthur Belli • - ------- -- --- - -------- - D.N.L •..•.
Anthony Astore •- ----- --- ------- ---- ------ ------Raflael Sabbato •-- --- --- ________ .• ---- ____ --- ---Eugenio Stephano Campo' (U.S. v. D.N.L •..•.
Nicholas Nardone. et al.) •
Frank Joseph Caracci'- --- ---- --- ----- E.D.la ---Vincent J. Marcello'-- - ---- ----------------------Salvadore J. Marcello • (U.S. v. Baily - -- -- -- -- --

N~~,~~~lvella •------- --- --·---- --- - W.O.Mo. . ..
:~at~~?o!~:~~~ -~~~~~~~-~ . : : : : ::::::::::::::::::::

Boss of the Kansas City Syndicate.

.
Joseph Colombo, Sr.•.-------- -- -- ---·- E.O.N.Y. __ _ Boss ofthe BroklynSyndicated· Colombo has been mcapacitate by an
assassin's bullet
Thomas Amato •--·-- -- -- --- ----- - --------------- Albert Di Stephano•- -- -· -- --------·- - S.D.Ohio __ later committed suciide.
Jack Herman • (U.S. v. Sam Winer, et S.D. Fla ••• ••
al.)
John James LaGorg11 • (U.S. v. Irwin W.D.Pa
Charles A1er. et al.)
.
.
•
Joseph Louis Lanza • -- --- ------- --- N.O.Ra. --John Nardi •- --- -- -- ----· --- -· -·----- N.D.Oh1o • •• Nard1 and Delsanter are h1gh-rankrn1
members of the Cleveland Syndicate.
Anthony Delsanter• (U.S. v. Joseph --·---- -- - --James Lanese. et al.)
Frank Thomas Narducci • --·--- ---- - E.D.Pa • •• ••
Louis Ruggirello • - ------- - ---- --- -- E.D.Mich ___
Anthony lmbrunone •------- -- - ---------------- --1 This list does not Include persons who have been acquitted or persons whose convictions
have been reversed on appeal.
• Persons named in the same indictment are listed together.
• Case involved utilization of court-ordered eleetronic survelllanee.
• Case involved both the ·utilization of court-ordered surveillance and a violation of
18 u.s.c. 1955.

~-·

Name

District

Comments

John. Pa5quale Tronolone 1 (U.S. v. S.O. Aa••••.
Dade Marder. etal.)
Indictments. 1972:
Frank Cerone~---- --- - --- -- - --- --- --- N.D.III ___ __
)llexander "Pope Oee" Dalessio I -- --- E.D.N.Y•• . •
Henry Tratlicante •------·- -------- - -- - M.D.Ra ____ Boss of the large Florida Syndicate.
Peter Valente • (U.S. v. Ernest Mario, S.O.N.Y - - -et al.)
Convictions 1971:
Samuel Riuo Oe Cavalcante •------- --- D.N.L . -- -- Boss of the New Jersey Syndicate.
Charles Majuri ' --- ------- --- ------ ---------- ---- Joseph Ippolito • -- --- -- -- -------- -- ------ ---- --Anthony Oe Pasque• - - -- ------ --- · - -- ------ --- -Alessio Barrasso'-- - ------ -------- -- ---- ---- ---- Nick Zarro • - ----- - ---- ------------ -- -- -- ----- -Ralph Masciola •----- -- ---- -------- --- --- ---- -- --Joseph Anthony Ferrarra •- - ----- --- --------------Pasquale Monzelli •- --- -- -------- -- --- E.D.Pa _____
.
James Michael Pignetti - ---- --- ----- S.O.N.Y .••.
Nicholas Ratteni (U.S. v. William Alter, S.D.N.Y - - -- High-ranking memberofthe Genovese
et al.)
Syndicate.
Convictions, 1972:
Nicholas Fino • (U.S. v. Joseph Fino, et W.D.N.Y••
al.)
Jack Anthony Lucido -- --- ---- -- --- - E.D.Mich __ _
Peter Cavataio (U.S. v. Donald Dawson, ---- ------ -et~

.

Francis Santo (U.S. v. AI Mones, et at.) •. S.D.Fia__ __ _
Anthony Joseph Zerilli.. ____ ___ ________ C.D.CaliL .• Zerilli and Poliui are high-ranking
members of the Detroit Syndicate.
Michael Santo Poliui - ---- -- --------- -----------Anthony Giardano • • ___ -- --- - ____ -- -- ------ -- -- ---

• Unless otherwise noted, Ute defendants listed were also the defendants named in the
title of the indictment, e.g., the case in which Michael Astarita was prosecuted was filed
as U.S. v. Astarita.
• case involved utilization of 18 U.S.C. 1955.

4.

EXHIBIT NO. 5
GAMBLING OPERATIONS INDICTED BY ORGANIZED CRI!IIIE AND RACKETEERING SECTION DURING FISCAL YEAR 1971

J:.M::~!i~!V:fvi~~= :t.=:;iirdiiricieiiiCiiiiiiiC:siiiYeiuanc.i~~~::::::::~:::~:~::::~~::~====::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Gamblong ondictments involving violations oilS U.S.C.l955 _______________ _____________________________________ __________________________________ _
Gambling indictmenls involving both the use of court-ordered electronic surveiOance and violations oll8 U.S.C. 1955_______________ ~--------------------

llldidmenls

Estimated annual

1129

$867,465,000
766,871,000
440, 160, 000
420, 565, 000

89
55
45

t T:tis total includes only the indictments of gamb.ing operations doing a significant annual business; the total comprises 76 percent of the 169 indictments returned by the section during fiscal
year 1971.
•
EXHIBIT NO. 6

-

CONVICTIONS OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN MAJOR GAMBLING RINGS, FISCAL YEAR 1972

Case

Numberol
defendants
convicted Size of operatioll

Case

U.S. v. William Alter, et al S.D.N.Y. 0971)_______ _

6 Handled

U.S. v. David Marder,• et at S.D. Fla. 0971)________ _
U.S. v Sol Tilkin, et al. N.D. Ohio (1971)___________ _

2 Handled $150,000 a week..
2 Records sllowed $2110,000 business in a 5-day period.

U.S. v. Raul Jimenez, et aiS.D.N.Y. 0971)_________ _
U.S. v. Joseph Colombo, et al. E.D.N.Y. (1971) ____ __
U.S. v. Petter Tenore,• ef at S.D.N. Y. (1972)________ _

over $50

annually~

miDion

7 Handled $5 million a year.
14 Annual gross of $10 millioiL
5 Handled $10,000 a day.

• Court-ordered electronic surveillance used in investigating the case..
: Case mvolved violation ol 18 U.S.C. 1955.

U.S. v. Vincent Cafaro ' etal S.D.N.Y. 0912)_______ _
U.S. w. Vincent Peter Pisacano,t et al. S.D.N.Y(1912).
U.S. v. Earl Benton,> et at S.D.N. Y. (1972) .. -------U.S v. Nonnan Simon,• etal. D.C. Calif (1972) _____ _
U.S.v. Richard Becker.'elal. S.D.N.Y. (1972) ______ _
U.S. v. Ronald Sacco.'elal. N.D. Calif.(l912) _______ _

Number of
defendants
convicted Size of operatioR
4 Handled $65,000 a week.
6 Handled $2.9 million annually.
1 Handled $5,000 a day.
6 Grossed $10,000 a day.
7 Grossed approximately $125,000aday.
13 Annual gross of over $15
million.

' Prosecution of case involved bolh the utilization of court-ordered electronic surveollance and a
violation ol 18 U.S.C. 1955.

15 August 1973
Justice Powell:
You will find attached a draft of Part I of my memorandum
on Robinson and Gustafson. I intend to address the exclusionary
rule in Part II.--since the two Parts address e~sily severable
questions, I thought you mi&ht wish to see Part I at this time.

/

You will also find enclosed the briefs filed in Gustafson.
With the exception of the amicus brief filed by the state of ·
Illinois, ~ these papers do not address the exclusionary rule
issue. I understand that that subject is discussed in the
Robinson briefs, which you now havcS~ in Richmond. When you
have finished re _ ing them, pleaseASally to send them to me.

)

JCJjr

\

'·

MEMORANDUM
TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM: JCJ jr
RE:

No. 72-936, United States v. Robinson
No. 71-1669, Gustafson v. Florida
Introduction

United States v. Robinson.

!/

On 19 Apri11968 Officer Jenks stopped Robinson's car for
a "routine spot check" and examined Robinson's car registration,
draft card, and temporary operator's license.

On later reviewing

his notes of the encounter, Jenks noticed a substantial discrepancy
in the information Robinson had provided.

A check of police traffic

records revealed that Robinson's driver's license had been revoked
and that Robinson had obtained a temporary operator's permit by
fraud.
When Jenks next spotted the car, he stopped it, arrested
Robinson, and made the full field search required by D. C. police
regulations for an in-custody arrest.

In a pocket of Robinson's

outer clothing, Jenks found a wadded-up cigarette pack containing
14 gelatin capsules of heroin .

. '.

2.

2/
Gustafson v. Florida.A Florida policeman stopped Gustafson's car because it
was "weaving" back and forth across the center line.

Gustafson

was asked to produce his driver's license. When he could not do
so, the policeman arrested him and undertook a thorough search.
He discovered a cigarette pack with two marijuana cigarettes.
These cases raise two
..__ important questions.

First, what

search is permissible incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic
violation? Second, assuming some 4th Amendment violation, is
exclusion of the evidence obtained necessarily the appropriate
remedy?

3.
I.

The 4th Amendment Right -- Search Incident to Arrest

cv~~ f ~

's

c~l-~1~)

The vast majority of all searches made today are justified

~~

,uv-.
; ~~ . .-r. .y~.L.LK

under the exception to the warrant requirement for searches
~~
~/
incident to lawful arrest.
The rationale for this exception lies rl~·~ 1
::.;..--partly in the demands of necessity and partly in the belief that

!Aft..'"'"'

--

the arrest rather than any subsequent search constitutes the
significant intrusion of state power into an individual's privacy.
An individual who has suffered the humiliation and inconvenience of

arrest, so the argument runs, no longer retains any significant
expectation that his person will be free from governmental interference.

Under this line of reasoning, the validity of the search

depends only on the strength of the state's justification for the
initial intrusion, the arrest.
Both the D. C. Circuit in Robinson and the intermediate

4/
state appellate court in Gustafson- rejected the broad thrust of
this argument in favor of a more discrete inquiry into whether a
particular arrest renders a subsequent search reasonable.

.v

Specifically, these courts concluded that arrest for a crime

~G;? ! '{p .
11~·1 ?~

W...vt..1,r

OHtR.~JJ

_ . . .,

~

4.
normally involving no physical evidence (notably traffic offenses
and such status offenses as vagrancy) justifies at most only a
"patdown" or weapons frisk of the arrestee.

Although the cases

are similar, Robinson depicts the key considerations in somewhat
sharper relief.
Before exploring the merits of the Robinson decision, it
may be helpful to state explicitly what is ......__
not at issue in these cases .
Neither Robinson nor Gustafson is an auto search case.

Both involved

evidence found on the person. Of course, most people arrested for
traffic offenses will be apprehended while in vehicles, but this fact
is analytically inconsequential.

Robinson would present exactly the

same issue if, on discovering the fraudulently obtained operator's
permit, Officer Jenks had gone directly to Robinson's home and
arrested him there.

Correspondingly, the car search question --

how to apply Chimel to an automobile -- is not limited to traffic
offenses but arises whenever a criminal suspect is apprehended in

6/
a vehicle.

5.

A.
Judge Wright's opinion for the Robinson plurality rests on
the fundamental premise that the scope and intensity of a search are
limited by the justification therefor.

Robinson carries this premise

beyond the precedents of this Court.

The most direct support is found

7/
in Peters v. New York.-

There the Court upheld the search of a

burglary suspect as incident to a lawful arrest and made the additional
observation that the search was "reasonably limited in scope":
Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained
and thorough- going examination of Peters and his
personal effects. He seized him to cut short his
flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons. Y
Despite these remarks, the law is more accurately described as a

9/
,

"categorical"
rule- allowing a full search of any person lawfully
_.....__ -~

arrested for any crime.

In his separate concurrence to Peters, Mr .

.Justice Harlan
__....___ was quick to note that the Court's remarks about the
intensity of Officer Lasky's search did not reflect his understanding
of the law:
The second possible source of confusion is the
Court's statement that "Officer Lasky did not engage
in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination of
Peters and his personal effects. " . . . Since the
Court found probable cause to arrest Peters, and
since an officer arresting on probable cause is entitled
to make a very full incident search, I assume that this
ismere y a factual observation. 10 1

7.

'

appellants' convictions but added a vigorous and thoughtful statement
of the position later adopted by the Robinson plurality.

---

whole, this group of precedents is far from conclusive.

Taken as a
They voice

a widespread and very real concern over the potential for an intolerable
invasion of privacy, but analytically they add little to the line of
precedents relied on most heavily by Judge Wright --the stop-andfrisk cases.
---

14 I

15 I

Robinson is founded on Terry v. Ohio- and Sibron v. New York.There this Court recognized that street encounters between policemen
and citizens are often hostile and sometimes dangerous.

The Court

concluded that a rule allowing an officer to search a suspect only if
he arrests him would subject the police to unnecessary and unjustifiable
danger of injury from a concealed weapon.

The Court held that a

policeman might lack probable cause to arrest but have some legitimate
reason to stop a suspect and detain him temporarily for questioning.
If he has reasonable grounds to believe that that suspect might be

armed and dangerous, the policeman may engage in a weapons frisk
designed to locate and uncover concealed weapons.
Thus, the Terry "patdown" came into existence as a new
term in the lexicon of the 4th Amendment.

Although both a search

and a patdown are governed by the same general principles, they

6.
And in an earlier decision, Judge Wright noted with palpable distaste
the wide acceptance of the doctrine that a lawful arrest justifies a
full search of the person of the arrestee:
The idea that a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest always satisfies the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness has become a virtual shibboleth,
unthinkably repeated by the courts.!.!/

In~~ has this Court held inadmissible e~

--

found on the person

of one lawfully placed under arrest.
In the instant case, however, Judge Wright cites a long list

of federal and state decisions in support of the proposition that "a
police officer has no right to search either the person or the vehicle
incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a mere motor vehicle

-

~/

regulation~'------~

The federal decisions, at least, are not so persuasive

as Judge Wright suggests.

Many of the cases really concern searches

of cars rather than people.

Many of them involve situations in which

the police clearly had probable cause to search, and the courts,
upholding the searches, worry aloud about the potential for abuse
in allowing a full search of both car and person incident to the arrest
of the driver for a minor traffic violation.

Judge Wright singles

out as his strongest supporting authority just such a case. In
13 I
United States v. Humphrey- a panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed

(
1

8.
are different animals.

A full search entails the most minute exami-

nation of the suspect's person and clothing and, in the case of search
incident to arrest, of the area within the suspect's reach.
patdown is only a weapons frisk.

The

On the other hand, a search must

be conducted pursuant to a warrant or justified under one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. In the case of
a search incident to arrest, the officer must know "facts sufficient
to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing
16 I

a crime . . . . " - The patdown, however, is available incident to
a reasonable stop if the policeman has some indication that the
suspect may be armed.
Judge Wright does not believe that every forcible stop or
even every arrest warrants a weapons patdown. He would permit
the officer to frisk only "when there exist special facts or circumstances which give the officer reasonable grounds to believe that

17 I

the person with whom he is dealing is armed and presently dangerous."r

Ju~ Wright analogized the 'f outine traffic arrest to a forcible stop.
In those situations, the policeman must have some objective indication
that the suspect or arrestee is armed in order to undertake a limited
weapons search.

But the Robinson plurality also recognized that the

justification for a Terry patdown could also be found in the character

9.
and duration of the encounter between cop and civilian. If the officer
takes an arrestee into his custody, his exposure to danger if the
arrestee is armed is very great.
-

Therefore, Judge Wright concluded

lt/flllll"'

-

th~~ody arrest always justified a weapons frisk. { ,£,;cf ~

a..

~~

The core of Wright's opinion is the application to searches
incident to arrest of the reasoning developed by the Supreme Court
in the related but distinct circumstance of the stop-and-frisk. Neither;
Terry nor Sibron involved an arrest.

Peters did.

The issue raised

by Robinson and Gustafson is whether the "search" incident to arrest
for a traffic offense is a full search or, at most, a Terry patdown.
Judge Wright's answer proceeds logically from the reasoning
of Terry.

The two possible justifications for a warrantless search

are (1) protecting the police from injury from concealed weapons,
and (2) preventing the suspect from concealing or destroying evidence
in his possession.

Most traffic offenses involve no physical evidence
~/
which would be concealed on the person.
Therefore, a search
incident to arrest for such an offense serves no evidentiary function
with respect to that crime.

Stated another way, arrest for a traffic

1 offense normally does not constitute probable cause to search the

arrestee for evidence of that offense.
search is fulfilled by a Terry patdown.

The protective function of the
Therefore, the 4th Amendment

H •,

dMt. /-f~M_f<~

10.
limits the police to a weapons frisk, the least intrusive means of
satisfying the only legitimate rationale in the circumstances.
The argument of the Robinson plurality can also be phrased
more dramatically.

Although he never says it this way, Judge

Wright's analysis calls for the abolition of "incident to lawful arrest"
as an independent doctrinal justification for a warrantless search.
In every custody arrest, he will have ample authority to frisk for

weapons.

But as Terry and Sibron make plain, justification for a

patdowJl does not depend on the fact of arrest but on the character
of the encounter between cop and civilian.

A forcible stop involves

considerably less invasion of personal privacy than an arrest.

As

the greater intrusion, arrest requires the greater justification. In
every factual context in which an officer has probable cause to arrest,
he will have more than reasonable grounds to stop the potential
arrestee. If he has additional grounds to believe the arrestee is
armed, he can engage in a Terry patdown.
not he actually makes an arrest.

This is true whether or

Permitting a patdown in every

custody arrest does not reveal reliance on the fact of arrest but only
recognition of the danger of long and close contact with a suspect who
just might be armed.

11.

Under Robinson, the fact that a policeman does make an
~est, ~n

a frisk.

I

a custody a;::;st, does net entitle him to go further than }

Justification for a full search arises not from the fact of

arrest but from an independent determination of probable cause
19 I

and exigent circumstances.- The latter requirement will always
be met by the potential ability of an arrestee to conceal or destroy
evidence on his person.

In most cases, the former requirement will

be satisfied by the same underlying facts that constitute probable
cause for arrest.

The Robinson plurality identifies two categories

of crimes which lack the usual coexistence of probable cause to
arrest and probable cause to search. A reasonable belief that a
20/
suspect committed a traffic offense- or a status crime does not
mean that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds for an
evidentiary search.

The nature of those crimes is such that a

search would have no evidentiary function.

-

This line of analysis

reduces the once conclusive impact of the phrase "incident to a
lawful arrest" to a mere shorthand reference to those situations
in which the police happen to have both probable cause to arrest and
probable cause to search.
All in all, Robinson casts some long shadows. One big question
is whether the Robinson analysis can be successfully articulated in

12.
terms of categories of crimes.

Robinson would cover most traffic

offenses, but driving under the influence of either alcohol or drugs
is an exception.

An officer making an arrest for this offense would

have probable cause to search the arrestee for evidence.

Judge

Wright notes that some status offenses, e. g. , vagrancy, also come
21/
within the terms of this analysis.-- Yet the Robinson reasoning
really has nothing to do with the categorization of offenses but with
whether, in a particular case, an arresting officer had probable
cause to undertake a full evidentiary search.

What about arrests

for offenses committed some time previously? If, some six months
after the crime, a policeman spots a man believed to have been
involved in a theft of color televisions, does that cop have probable
cause to search the arrestee? Absent some remarkable new advance
by the Japanese, he will not have a TV concealed on his person.

The

probability that he will be carrying burglar's tools, for example,
or gloves used in the theft is no higher than if he were illegally
stopped and searched for being a "known" criminal.

The point is

this: Although Robinson was conceived as an answer to the problem
of searches incident to arrest for traffic offenses, its logic is not
so limited.

Taken at its flood tide, Robinson demands an independent

evaluation of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest,
---

~
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regardless of whether probable cause may fail because of the

~

~

~---------------------------

character of the crime or the passage of time or perhaps even
~---~

-._........-

~

the context of the arrest.
The Robinson decision casts unsettling implications in other
directions as well.

J

strict adherence to the principle that a search

may be only so broad as the justification therefor led the plurality
to assert that containers should be confiscated but not opened.

Any

enclosed weapon is thereby removed from the arrestee's grasp, but
any evidence remains unrevealed.
Lastly, acceptance of Robinson would greatly increase the
pressure to limit predetention inventory searches.

The police

inventory prisoners' clothes and personal effects in order to prevent
certain items from being introduced into the jails and to protect
themselves against claims of loss and theft.

These goals could be

as effectively attained by allowing prisoners to waive any later claims
and place their possessions in a sealed box or envelope.

Thus the

"legitimate" goals of the inventory search are satisfied but the
exploratory element of this procedure is eliminated. The Robinson
analysis argues strongly for this limitation of inventory searches.
Furthermore, Robinson tends to undercut inventory searches practically as well as theoretically. In a great many cases, the opportunity
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to inventory a prisoner's clothes and effects duplicates the search made
incident to arrest.

To the extent that the latter justification for a full

evidentiary search is removed, the inventory search and the asserted
rationales therefor, will come under increasingly close scrutiny.

B.
Hope fully, the preceding section adequately outlines the antecedents and implications of Robinson.

The following is a more personal

commentary on the major choices which you now confront.
In general, Robinson is a strong opinion.

Judge Wright has

restated the law of search incident to arrest with more sophistication
and subtlety than has been devoted to this subject heretofore.

The

guiding principle -- that the form and scope of a search are limited by
the justification for that search -- has undeniable appeal.

Although

Robinson is an innovation in the law, Judge Wright's reasoning is
strongly buttressed by this Court's opinions in Terry, Sibron and
Peters.

And there is undoubtedly widespread agreement with Wright's

1

evaluation that a full evidentiary search incident to arrest for a simple
traffic violation is a regrettable, perhaps intolerable, invasion of
personal privacy.

The vigor of Wright's exposition notwithstanding,

9
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Robinson raises several questions.
the Robinson decision affords adequate protection to the police,

~hether it announces guidelines which cops on the beat can understand and follow,

a~ether we are really ready to embrace the

necessary implications of the Robinson analysis.
Protection of the Police
This inquiry consists of two elements: whether the Terry
patdown should be automatically available only in cases of custodial
arrest, and whether the officer who makes a custody arrest is sufficiently
protected by a weapons frisk.
The Robinson plurality analogized a non-custodial arrest for a
traffic offense to a forcible stop as authorized and defined by Terry.
22/
Each involves "merely a brief on-the-street encounter, "- and neither
reveals any propensity for violence on the part of the suspect or arrestee.
Having established the analogy, Judge Wright then applied his understanding of Terry to the context of the non-custodial arrest for a traffic
offense. In both situations, the officer may frisk for weapons "only
when there exist special facts or circumstances which give the officer
reasonable grounds to believe that the person with whom he is dealing
23/
is armed and dangerous. -
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Judge Wright's interpretation of Terry, while certainly not
beyond question as a policy matter, is fairly supported by that decision.
While Chief Justice Warren's opinion is not entirely clear on this point,
it does include. language supporting the proposition that a policeman
must have objective justification for a forcible stop arrl additional,
independent justification for a frisk incident thereto. In his concurrences,
Mr. Justice Harlan refined this reasoning. He thought a patdown automatically justified when incident to a stop for suspicion of a crime of

24/
violence- but not when "the suspected offense creates no reasonable

25/
apprehension for the officer's safety. "The problem with the position taken by the Robinson plurality ~

~~

i~ that the ana~ between ~ble stop ~d a non-custodial arrest ~<t.t-c.-+

for a traffic offense is far from exact.

Usually, the traffic offender

will be apprehended while in a vehicle.

A car or truck provides many

opportunities for concealing a weapon.

Even a routine traffic arrest

results in an encounter of some duration.

If the offender remains in

his own car, he may have an opportunity to retrieve a hidden weapon
without being observed by the officer standing outside the vehicle. If,
on the other hand, the policeman requires the arrestee to sit in the
patrol car while being questioned, he can prevent him from reaching
any weapon concealed in his car but the officer is then in such close

·
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proximity to the arrestee that he is exceedingly vulnerable to attack
with a weapon concealed on the person.

Judge Wright is undoubtedly

correct in noting that commission of a traffic offense indicates no
propensity to violence, but if the traffic offender is in fact armed
and dangerous, the policeman's exposure to risk will be significantly
greater than in the case of an on-the-street cop. In my opinion, the
arresting officer should be allowed to frisk for weapons whenever he
feels the need to do so.

I would not restrict the availability of this

procedure to custody arrests and those situations in which the
officer has some objective indication that the arrestee is armed.
The second question is whether a weapons frisk is sufficient
protection for the officer who takes the arrestee into custody.

The

dissenters in Robinson argued that the policeman's removal of a
crumpled cigarette pack and discovery of the heroin capsules contained
therein were legitimate aspects of a routine protective search. Officer
Jenks felt an unidentified small object in Robinson's pocket:
Even after Jenks was able to feel the size and texture
of the cigarette pack inside the pocket, his remaining
uncertainty was legitimate. He could have squeezed the
pack while it was still in Robinson's pocket. But all that
would have told him was that the "objects" inside were
definitely not cigarettes. The possibility remained that
they were any number of harmful objects, from small
blades to live bullets. That possibility is exactly what
the routine protective search procedure was designed
to eliminate.
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Yet a majority of theCA concluded that Jenks' actions could not be
justified as a Terry patdown.

This seems correct.

An officer standing

on the street with a stopped suspect is probably vulnerable only to
attack with weapons that can be easily identified by a frisk.

He runs

no substantial risk that a suspect, while under his surveillance, will
reach into his pocket, remove a cigarette pack, take from it some
small but lethal weapon, and attack the policeman.

If, on the other

hand, the officer arrests the suspect, takes him into custody and transports him to a police station, his vulnerability is significantly increased.
In Terry, the Supreme Court made reference to the following

description of a frisk.
[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search
must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits,
waistline and back, the groin and area around the
testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down
to the feet.26/
Apparently, the patdown is a rather thorough procedure.

Judge Wilkey's

contention that every small bulge discovered by a frisk must be fully
investigated is not without force.

On balance, however, I am persuaded

that the risk that an arrestee would have on his person a weapon so
cleverly concealed that its presence could not be discovered by a frisk
is negligible.

I am also convinced that had Officer Jenks been trying

to uncover weapons and only weapons, he would have had little difficulty
in determining that a wadded-up cigarette pack containing 14 capsules
posed no threat.

r
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standards for Police Conduct
The Robinson dissenters argued strenuously against discarding
a settled and easily understandable standard for police conduct in favor
of an approach requiring cops in the field to make distinctions of
considerable subtlety:
Judge Wright's opinion throughout is based on a
subjective a_pproach, i. e. , whether the officer actually
felt fear and acted on that in making the search. In so
doing, I submit Judge Wright interjects the Terry
requirements for a "stop and frisk" into a full custodial arrest
situation, which is quite different, and which I urge can best
be handled by a more objective, standardized routine
approach. I say "best, " and I mean "best"for society,
the officer, and the individual apprehended. 27/
Judge Wright's approach is not entirely subjective, but it does place a
heavy burden on the policeman in the field.

The officer who arrests

someone for a routine traffic offense may experience some vague
feeling of apprehension.

After Robinson he will wonder whether he

could successfully explain that feeling in terms of objective indicia
that the arrestee might be armed and dangerous.

Uncertain of how

reasonable his perceptions will appear to a reviewing court, the
policeman may choose to take the arrestee into custody whenever,
for whatever reason, he wishes to frisk for weapons.

To some extent,

therefore, the protection to the arrestee supposedly afforded by the
Robinson plurality may be illusory.

Theoretically, of course, a
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policeman now makes precisely this evaluation every time he stops
a suspect on the street. Robinson, however, vastly increases the
frequency with which a cop must decide whether he has reasonable
grounds to believe a suspect armed and dangerous and correspondingly
expands the occasions on which reviewing courts must try to secondguess police decisions.
If the officer concludes that he does have reasonable grounds to

believe a traffic offender might be armed and dangerous, or if he
takes the arrestee into custody, he is entitled to engage in a Terry
patdown. Suppose he feels a small lump in the arrestee's pocket. He
must decide whether it might be a weapon of some sort. If he takes the
commands of Robinson faithfully, the frisk will not be a rapid and
entirely routine procedure but may involve some very delicate judgment calls.

The policeman now makes these same decisions whenever

he frisks a suspect incident to a lawful stop, but the two situations are
not entirely comparable.

The officer who plans to take an arrestee into

custody and rides with him to the stationhouse may be considerably
more apprehensive about the retention by the arrestee of small,
seemingly insignificant objects.

This increased concern is likely to

result in more borderline decisions necessitating judicial review.

The

instant case illustrates how reasonable men, even reasonable judges,

22.
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can differ over what an arresting officer could reasonably conclude
might be a weapon.
Lastly, quite apart from deciding how to apply Robinson,
the policemen in the field may face the not inconsiderable difficulties of deciding when to apply Robinson.

This point was aptly

made by the D. C. Court of Appeals. On almost identical facts, that
court rejected both the Robinson result and the reasoning behind it:
We thus perceive no justification for applying
Terry standards to a situation involving a valid arrest.
Further, analytically there is no basis for limiting the
Robinson majority's thinking to a custodial arrest for
a "traffic" offense. [T]he rationale of Robinson readily
may be expanded to apply to numerous crimes which
technically may be free of fruits or instrumentalities.
To make the nature of the offense the key to whether a
full search may be undertaken as part of a valid arrest
inevitably would be to create still another judicial morass,
and would greatly complicate the day-to-day performance
of the police officer's vital duties. 28/
An Alternative to the Robinson Analysis
If you doubt the wisdom of the Robinson decision, you may be

interested in this brief statement of an alternative view.

This line

of reasoning begins with a statement of the role of the 4th Amendment -to prevent unwarranted governmental intrusions into areas of an
individual's life about which he entertains legitimate expectations of
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privacy. Whatever the ancillary consequences of this constitutional
guarantee, its purpose was not to allow those who have committed
crimes to avoid being found out, but rather to shield innocent citizens
from unjustifiable invasions of privacy in the name of law enforcement.
But respect for privacy has its costs.

Presumably, observance of the

4th Amendment's guarantee of privacy prevents the police from using
some very efficient methods of uncovering crime.
The alternate to Robinson rejects the fundamental assumption
underlying that decision -- the notion that an individual has an incremental
interest in privacy.

Under this view, the arrest is the significant

intrusion of state power into the realm of individual affairs normally
termed private. Assuming the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest
b
guarded,.J he 4th Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental interest. At that point the arrestee retains no
significant interest in the privacy of his pers en.

Therefore; there

exists no reason to hamper law enforcement by requiring some independent justification for a search incident to a lawful arrest.

Under

but is, rather, an independent doctrinal exception to the warrant
requirement.
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This view has been well stated by the Ninth Circuit in
Charles v. United States:
Power over the body of the accused is the essence of
his arrest; the two cannot be separated. To say that
the police may curtail the liberty of the accused but
refrain from impinging upon the sanctity of his pockets
except for enumerated reasons is to ignore the custodial
duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody
must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever the
arrested party has in his possession at the time of apprehension. Once the body of the accused is validly subjected
to the physical dominion of the law, inspections of his
person, regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed
unlawful, unless they violate the dictates of reason
either because of their number or their manner of
perpetration. 29 I
Two points about the Charles decision deserve mention.
pre-dates Terry.

First, it

Although Terry does not speak directly to the issue

of search incident to arrest, at the highest level of generality Terry
and Charles are inconsistent. Second, the court in Charles was

---

obviously contemplating a custody arrest.
One way to address the problem of full searches incident to
traffic violations is to focus on whether the arresting officer took
the offender into custody.

The arrestee who is merely issued a

summons need not go to the stationhouse. Mter a brief local detention,
he may proceed on his way. His privacy interest has not been
substantially eliminated by the fact of arrest if the police do not
assert custody and control over his person.

Therefore, it would
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not be illogical to require that the police have an independent justification for a search incident to a non-custodial arrest.
This line of reasoning would require that Robinson be reversed.
That case involved a fairly serious offense for which District police
regulations require a custody arrest.
search was justified.

Therefore, a full evidentiary

Gustafson would require somewhat different

treatment.

The cases establish that an arrest which is merely a
30/
pretext for an incidental search is invalid. Acceptance of the
proposition that only a custodial arrest justifies a full evidentiary
search might suggest that a driver who was taken into custody for
a traffic offense for which summonses are routinely issued should

1-t:
have an opportunity that he was placed under custodial arrest as a
pretext for the incidental search.

Clearly this would be hard to

establish, and the remedy would only be available in extreme cases.
) Gustafson could be remanded to afford that petitioner an opportunity
\ to make this showing. Of course, police regulations frequently provide
which traffic offenses warrant custodial arrests and which do not.
Additionally, there are informal pressures against making unnecessary
custodial arrests.

The officer who takes into custody a violator of

the most mundane traffic regulation and conducts a full evidentiary
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search may well leave himself open to the charge of pretext.

These

caveats notwithstanding, limiting full searches to custodial arrests
is largely an illusory reform.

Perhaps the ultimate question is

how closely you wish to circumscribe police conduct.

('

27.
II.

The 4th Amendment Remedy - The Exclusionary Rule
The government urges the abandonment of exclusion of the
evidence as the required remedy for every violation of the 4th amendment:.
In determining when to exact the drastic remedy of
exclusion of reliable and probative evidence of
guilt, it is appropriate to distinguish those searches
that are reasonably motivated and are unlikely to be
deterred . . . from sea3cbes that involve flagrant
and willful violations. _]/
In essence, the SG endorses the A. L. I. proposal to suppress illegally
obtained evidence only in instances of flagrant and substantial violations
of the 4th amendment:
A motion to suppress evidence shall be granted
only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is
based was substantial, or if otherwise required in the
Constitution of the United States or of this State. In
determining whether a violation is substantial the court
shall consider all the circumstances, including:
(a) the importance of the particular interest
violated;
(b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(c) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(d) the extent to which privacy was invaded.
(e) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent
violations of this Code;
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(f) whether, but for the violation, the things
seized would have been discovered; and
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced
the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to
defend himself in the proceeding in which the things
32/
seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
The fate of this proposal may well be the most important question
before the Court this Term.
A

Acceptance of the A. L. I. proposal involves a dramatic repudiation
of precedent. Exclusion of illegally seized evidence has been required in

33/

34/

federal courts since 1914

and in state courts since 1961. 35/
rule has been followed without exception to this date.

The

--

The threshold problem is to identify the precise analytical basis
for the rule. The A. L. I. proposal necessarily depends on the

assumption that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not a constitutional

--

right of the criminal defendant but rather a rule designed to deter police
misconduct and effectuate the guarantee of the 4th amendment. No case
has compelled this Court to choose between these two views of the rule,
and the opinions speak both of controlling police behavior generally and in
more normative terms of the need to "preserve the judicial process
36/
from contamination."
These highly moralistic pronouncements are
not, as some imply, inevitably inconsistent with the A. L. I. proposal.
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The idea that suppression of illegal evidence is required to avoid corruption
of the judicial process surely does not contradict the A. L. I.'s attempted
distinction between good faith error and flagrant and willful disregard
of the 4th amendment's guarantee. The courts would scarcely embrace
the taint of corruption by admitting evidence seized unlawfully but in a
good faith effort to comply with the substantive rules of search and
seizure.
The A. L. I. position, however, is irreconcilable with the view
that exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is a constitutional right
and therefore personal to the criminal defendant rather than a constitutionally required remedy designed to effectuate 4th amendment rights
generally. Under this view a piece of evidence is suppressed not so
much to contribute to a general policy of deterrence but because exclusion
is the only adequate remedy for this particular 4th amendment violation.

-

In other words, the defendant has a personal right to exclusion of

Nt>

illegal evidence. This is what commentators mean when they speak
of a normative justification for the rule.
The trouble with this theory is its sheer extravagance. The
criminal defendant who successfully moves to suppress evidence taken

7
I

from him in an unlawful search is not simply returned to the status
quo ante.

Before the illegal police action, he had some potential

criminal liability. After suppression of the evidence he will sometimes -notably for possession offenses -- have de facto immunity from prosecution.
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This result is difficult to justify in terms of that individual's right
to be free from unreasonable governmental invasions of privacy. The
fact that a policeman searched a man unlawfully does not make that man's

37/
possession of narcotics any the less illegal.
Whatever the merits of the choice between the normative and
factual justifications for the exclusionary rule, the weight of modern
38/
opinion clearly inclines toward the latter view.
More to the point,
you have already taken a position. The analysis you articulated in
Schneckloth v. Bustamante necessarily begins with the propositicm
that a citizen whose 4th amendment rights have been violated has no
constitutional right to suppress evidence obtained through the illegal action.
If the criminal defendant has that right, he may assert it in any available
forum. His claim cannot logically be denied on the ground that enforcement of his rights would have only a tenuous relation to controlling
police conduct.
If,then, exclusion is only a remedy required to effectuate 4th
~

amendment rights generally, it is vulnerable to the charge that it does
not work. Under this analysis, the mandate of the Constitution hinges
on the efficacy of the rule.

Suppression of evidence would be constitu-

tionally required (1) if no other remedy or collection of remedies effectively
deterred police illegality and (2) if the exclusionary rule did substantially
deter such misconduct.
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Other Remedies
The first proposition is easily established. Virtually everyone
agrees that whether or not the exclusionary rule works (or can work),
nothing else does. There are, however, numerous possibilities. First,
there are state damage actions, notably false arrest and trespass.
Since many states do not recognize good faith as a defense, strict
enforcement of these actions against policemen would be a catastrophe.
Therefore, courts have erected formidable barriers to recovery e.~.,

a conclusive presumption of probable cause to arrest from

conviction for the offense for which arrest was made. Furthermore,
there are many other reasons for the ineffectiveness of this remedy.
Civil suits are costly, and damages are exceedingly difficult to
establish. A policeman may be virtually judgment proof, and municipal
or sovereign immunity often bars recovery against his employer.
Dean Paulsen examined state tort remedies and concluded that they should
be available for cases of "[ al ctual injury caused by serious breaches of
duty committed in utter disregard of proper standards of police conduct."

--

39/

[Emphasis added.l -

To accomplish even this goal, significant

reforms -- notably use of a good faith defense and relaxation of
governmental immunity --would be needed. As for more ambitious
goals, Paulsen counselled that we should "abandon delusions of broad

40/

deterrence and substantial redress." -
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There is also a federal damage action under

§

1983. This remedy

has much the same weaknesses as state tort actions, and additionally
the policeman may invoke the "probable cause and good faith" defense
of Pierson v. Ray. This limitation on recovery is undoubtedly wise,

V

but it substantially vitiates any broader deterrent effect.
Injunctions may be useful when the police department is "engaged
in a clearly unconstitional course of conduct directed against an

41/
identifiable person or class of person,"

but as a general deterrent

injunctive relief clearly fails. And as for the potential deterrent effect
of criminal sanctions, one need only note the striking absence of cases
on the subject.

~·
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It is easy to establish that other available remedies do not effectively

deter police misconduct. That ts not to say, however, that the exclusionary
rule does a substantially better job.
Efficacy of the Exclusionary Rule
No one has delved more deeply into this largely factual inquiry
42/
than Professor Dallin Oaks.
You are familiar with his excellent
work detailing both the evidence and the arguments. You have also
indicated tentative interest in Oaks' conclusions:
There is no reason to expect the rule to have any
direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police
conduct that is not meant to result in prosecutions, and
there is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts any
deterrent effect on the small fraction of law enforcement
activity that is aimed at prosecution. What is known about
the deterrent effect of sanctions suggests that the exclusionary
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rule operates under conditions that are extremely
unfavorable for deterring the police. The harshest
criticism of the rule is that it is ineffective. It is
the sole means of enforcing the essential guarantees
of freedom from unreasonable arrests and searches
and seizures by law enforcement officers, and it is a
failure in that vital task.
The use of the exclusionary rule imposes
excessive costs on the criminal justice system. It
provides no recompense for the innocent and it frees
the guilty. It creates the occasion and incentive
for large scale lying by law enforcement officers.
It diverts the focus of the criminal prosecution from
the guilt or innocence of the defendant to a trial of the
police. Only a system with limitless patience with
irrationality could tolerate the fact that where there
has been one wrong, the defendant's, he will be punished,
but where there have been two wrongs, the defendant's
and the officer's, both will go free. This would not be
an excessive cost for an effective remedy against police
misconduct, but it is a prohibitive price to pay for an
illusory one . 43 I
Ruthlessly summarized, Professor Oaks'argument runs as
follows. First, there is no empirical evidence that suppression of
evidence effectively deters police misconduct. Second, reason suggests
that the context in which the rule operates is not conducive to its
purported function of deterrence. Invocation of this sanction does not
punish the offending policeman in any meaningful way. As a statement
of behaviorial norm, ,the rule must compete with an alternative view
of the policeman's duty, a view widely reinforced by the policeman's
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peers and superiors. Additionally, the police officer is often strongly
motivated to engage in prohibited conduct, e.g., he may want to recover
stolen property or to confiscate contraband and have no intention to
prosecute. Even if policemen were more receptive to the teachings
of the courts, Oaks argues, the judicially articulated rules governing
police behavior are ambiguous and uncertain, and they are not effectively
communicated to the individual law enforcement officer.

Lastly, Oaks

details the enormous costs of the rule. It does nothing for the innocent
but lets the guilty go free. It prompts policemen to fabricate compliance
with the dictates of the 4th amendment and gives them the opportunity
to immunize criminal conduct by purposefully overstepping the bounds of
legitimate police behavior. It diverts the attention of the courts and the
accused from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, and it has
certain untoward side effects on the criminal justice system.
These arguments notwithstanding, there are countervailing arguments.
In many instances, one can draw different inferences from Oaks' research.
For example, Oaks emphasizes that the sanction of suppressing illegally
seized evidence has negligible relevance to police conduct which is not
directed toward acquiring evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
Another observer might dwell on the importance of the exclusionary
rule in controlling police conduct which is so directed. Oaks himself
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makes the point:
In crimes such as homicide, where prosecution is almost
a certainty and where public interest and awareness are
high, the conditions for deterrence are optional and the
exclusionary rule is likely to affect police behavior. 44/
Oaks also quotes Professor Skotnick, who, after an extended opportunity
to observe police practices, concluded that "the exclusionary principle
puts pressure on the police to work within the rules in those cases
45/
when prosecution is contemplated."
The glass is either half
empty or half full.
Another factor not emphasized by Oaks is time. Exclusion of
the evidence has been the federal remedy for illegal police action since
1914. This may be one of a whole variety of reasons why federal
officers are thought to observe the 4th amendment somewhat more
regularly than their state and local counterparts. But the rule has been
applied to the states only since 1961. States which adopted this remedy
before Mapp were not subject to constant policing by federal courts
sitting in habeas proceedings. The states which did not previously
follow the rule undoubtedly went through a slow process of revising
standard operating procedures in light of Mapp.

Gaining acceptance

of the dictates there announced takes even longer: As Oaks admits:
Over the long term , however, the moral and educative
force of the exclusionary rule may wear away at the
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competing norms [for police behaviorl so that the
rule may ultimately be reinforced by a sense of moral
obligation. ~/
The experience of the first decade, no matter how disappointing, does not
establish that the rule will "ultimately" fail to deter illegal conduct.
The simple passage of time would be relatively unimportant were
it not for the substantial post-Mapp investment in police education:

We know that the rise and expansion of the
exclusionary rule has been accompanied by many
efforts at police education. Courses in police academies,
adult education programs for police sponsored by local
headquarters; courses in colleges and universities
offered to the police on the issues presented by the Fourth
Amendment have sprung up nearly everywhere. More and
more police leaders affirm the necessity for staying within
the rules. More and more police departments have become
interested in the formulation of guidelines for the officer
on the beat who must make snap judgments. It is difficult } 9 ~~
not to credit the exclusionary rule for some of these
developments. 47/
It is also difficult not to believe that this continuing commitment to

the task of educating policemen to the commands of the 4th amendment
will bear no fruit. In any event, it seems too early to abandon hope.
The exclusionary rule may, in fact, be gaining deterrence
capability. As Professor Oaks freely admits, we actually know precious
little about the rule in operation. Both sides of the argument are
48/
supported by "polemic , rhetoric , and intuition. "
Given the

37.

lack of established facts to restrict the free range of intuition, I
would like to close on the most salient fault I find with Oaks' analysis.
At one point he states:
At the very least it can be said that in terms of the
complexity of the rules, the area of arrest and search
seizure is not a favorable one for a deterrent sanction to be
effective. 49/
Ture enough, but is it not strange reasoning to lay the blame for the
lack of a demonstrable deterrent effect at the doorstep of the exclusionary
rule? Neither the suppression of evidence nor any other available
remedy will compel policemen to comply strictly with rules that they
cannot understand. Many court decisions make distinctions so learned
and subtle that some lawyers are baffled by their application to various
50/
factual contexts.
Is it reasonable therefore to conclude that police
failure to observe such rules is due primarily to the inability of the
exclusionary sanction to motivate compliance? Logic suggests not. To
the extent that the rule fails in its mission of deterrence because of
the obscurity of the underlying substantive rules, no deterrent will
be effective. Abandonment of the rule seems to me the counsel of

despair.
'

Where the underlying substantive standard is susceptible of

~
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straightforward articulation (as in a police manual), the exclusionary
remedy may be a powerful factor compelling its observance. For
example, does anyone seriously doubt that Miranda has greatly changed
police practices or question that the effect of that decision would have been
lessened dramatically had the sanction for non-compliance not been
exclusion of the illegal evidence? Chimel is an example of a 4th amtendment
decision that has been widely understood and followed. At least outside
the context of a car, the teaching of Chimel is reasonably clear - the
police may not search the entire premises or even the whole room but
only the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach.
Borderline questions assuredly arise, but I do not doubt that Chimel
has substantially revised police behavior. And, I do not believe that the
exclusionary sanction has been a negligible factor in effecting that change.
The same point can be made another way. In cataloguing the
costs of adhering to the rule, Professor Oaks makes the following
observation:
W. Kitch cites a tendency to modify the content of
the constitutional right to security from unreasonable
search and seizure according to what can realistically
be enforced by means of the exclusionary rule.
"It is all a bit backward," he observes . ..§.!_/
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I find that approach not at all backward. If a constitutional
standard is so arcane or unrealistic that it cannot be enforced by the
most effective available sanction, it should be junked. The 4th
amendment was not intended merely to state an ideal.

Without the

?/

exclusionary rule, this constitutional guarantee would be reduced to

.

(

that station.
B

Ostensibly, the issue before you is not whether the exclusionary
rule should be abandoned entirely but whether the Court should adopt

t;u

1

the intermediate position urged by the government. The A. L. I. proposal
distinguishes behavior flagrant and substantial 4th amendment violations
and good
faith errors resulting from ignorance or excessive zeal. One
,..
might also distinguish the application of the exclusionary sanction in state
courts from its role in federal courts or differentiate between direct
review and collateral relief. Although any relaxation of the rule implicates
the same basic issue, these three halfway houses do involve somewhat
different considerations and may evoke varying responses from your
colleagues.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamante, you fully explored the reasons
for distinguishing the exclusionary sanction as applied at trial or on

40.

direct review from its role in actions for post-conviction relief.
There you concluded:
Whatever the rule's merits on an initial trial and
appeal - a question not in issue here - the case
for collateral attack, the exclusionary rule retains
its major liabilities while the asserted benefit of the
rule dissolves. For whatever deterrent function
the rule may serve when applied on trial and appeal
becomes greatly attenuated when, months or years
afterward, the claim surfaces for collateral review.
The impermissible conduct has long since occurred,
and the belated wrist slap of state police by federal
courts harms no one but society on whom the
convicted criminal is newly released.
To my mind these remarks seem entirely sensible.
Whatever the merits of an attempted distinction between the
s~te

and federal aspects of the exclusionary rule, this approach is

52/
politically doubtful. It requires overruling Duncan v. Louisiana, 53/
as well as Mapp. The public statements of the Chief Justice -

54/
and those of Mr. Justice Stewart -

indicate that they may be inclined

to do so. To my knowledge, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist have
not taken public positions on the incorporation question. The stumbling
block is Mr. Justice White, author of both Duncan and Williams v.
Florida and foremost exponent of the theory that the 14th amendment
incorporates a-bill of rights guarantee either totally or not at all.
Mapp, Duncan, and Williams may well be too much for him to take on at
one time.

41.

The A. L. I. position reserves the sanction of exclusion for
"serious" cases of police misconduct. More particularly, the A. L. I.
proposal enumerates certain criteria for determining whether illegally
obtained evidence should be suppressed: the gravity of the violation
of law, the flagrancy of the officer's conduct, the foreseeable deterrent
effect, the existence of a casual link between the 4th amendment
violation and the discovery of the evidence, and the extent to which the
55/
violation has damaged the defendant's case.
The result would
be an unstructured, case-by-case application of the exclusionary
56/
'
sanction.
Clearly, adoption of this proposal would mean a
considerable sacrifice of uniformity and fairness in the criminal justice
system.

"-.....
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If you ultimately conclude that the exclusionary principle must

be abandoned, this proposal is a useful means to that end. Politically, it
has the appearance of a middle course. And it has the substantive virtue
of reserving for judges opportunities to express outrage at egregious
police behavior. It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the A. L. I.

7
I

proposal is significantly less drastic than outright abolition. Whatever
deterrent effect the rule has now, or might in the future acquire, would be

?
I

42.
undone. Mter all, those 4th amendment violations that are willful,
flagrant, and substantial are the one class of police actions which might
be inhibitied by other sanctions, either now or in the foreseeable future.
In all probability, both criminal and tort liability would be limited to
cases of extreme police conduct. It is the less dramatic violation, the
result not of malice but of carelessness and overzeal, for which no other
remedy exists. The rule's deterrent potential would be completely eliminated
precisely where it is most needed. The extreme cases can be handled q
through other means.

~ 1 ~~~ 1-o
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r
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From our conversation, I gather that you may be somewhat less
sanguine than I about the benefits of the exclusionary rule. If you decide
to abandon it, that will be time enough to consider whether you should
endorse the precise proposal of the A. L. I. or some variation on that
theme. I have dealt summarily with the arguments favoring abandonment
of the rule only because I thought you were intimately familiar with Oaks'
thesis. Although I disagree with him, I readily concede that his analysis
is powerful and well-reasoned. I will be glad to expand on any question
that you find inadequately treated here.
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why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a
person suspected of a serious crime should have to
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27/
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U. S . v. Willie Robinson

Summer Memorandum
This case, together with Gustafson v . Florida 71-1669
(see my separate memorandum), is on our list for special study .
Accordingly, this memorandum will be brief and merely to refresh
my recollection.
Statement of the Case
This case involves the validity of a search, with
probable cause but without warrant, incident to the arrest for
a traffic offense .

In addition to the question whether the

search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
applicability of the exclusionary rule under situations such
as those here involved also is briefed extensively .
Respondent was convicted by a jury of possession and
concealment of heroin and sentenced to eight years imprisonment .

On his first appeal to CADC, the Court en bane remanded

the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on
the scope of the search of respondent's person .

After such a

hearing, in which findings of fact and conclusions of law
were made (Appendix B, p . 8oa of petition), CADC again reheard
the case en bane and by a 5 to 4 vote reversed the conviction.
Officer Jenks stopped respondent ' s car on April 19,
1968, for a routine traffic check and made notes of his driver ' s
permit, vehicle registration and selective service classification

2.

card .

Discrepancies in birth dates were noted by Jenks who
checked the
nevertheless allowed respondent to depart . Jenks subsequent ly/
police recordsand discovered that respondent ' s permit had been
revoked and that a subsequent temporary permit had been iss u ed
to respondent on the basis of a fradulent application .
On April 23, and about midnight, Jenks again observed
respondent driving with two companions and signaled him to stop .
Jenks placed respondent under arrest and "proceeded to pat him
down" (H . Tr . 16-17) .

During the pat down, Jenks placed his

hand " on the breastpocket on the outside of (respondent ' s)
coat " and felt " something inside the coat which he could not
identify ."

Jenks then reached inside the pocket and pulled

out the object which was " a crumpled cigarette package", but
he still could not tell what was in it - except that it did
not contain cigarettes .
15 capsules of heroin .

Upon opening the pack, Jenks found
a

He thereafter complete

K:t~

" full field

search . . . feeling around his waist and on his trouser legs
and examining the remaining pockets . "

(H . Tr . 21)

The crime of operating a motor vehicle after revocation
is a serious one, carrying a mandatory minimum jail sentence
of 30 days with imprisonment up to a year .

The officer is

required by police regulations to make a summary arrest, take
the violator in custody, and book him at the stationhouse .
Moreover, in making such a " full custody" arrest, police
department instructions require the arresting officers to

3.
conduct a "full field search" .
Question Presented
As stated in the government ' s petition and brief
the question is as follows :
"Whether the Exclusionary Rule forumlated
under the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression
of contraband found in a cigarette pack taken from
a suspect _during - a full search of his person for
possible weapons, made incident to a lawful arrest
ana pursuant to a police regulation requiring such
searches of all prisoners . "
Although the exclusionary rule issue apparently was
to
raised in the court below, and was referreq/particularly in
Judge Wilkey ' s dissenting opinion, the principal issue
confronted by both opinions in CADA was the lawfulness of the
search under the circumstances .
Opinions Below
The majority and minority opinions do not read the
facts the same way .

Judge Wright's majority opinion states

that " there was no suggestion that (Jenks) believed it (the
unidentified object) to be a weapon or believed himself to be
in danger . "

Although I have not yet read the entire transcript

of evidence, it does appear that Jenks testified that :
" I didn't think about what I was looking for .
him . "

I just searched

Judge Wilkey, for the dissenting judges, treated the

search as a "protective one", emphasizing the hazard to police
officers of on-the - street confrontations especially where there

4.
probable cause to believe that the car driver has committed
one

felon~or

serious misdemeanor .

Judge Wilkey frames the issue as being the "reasonableness" of the protective routine established by the police depart ment (which Jenks follows) rather than the reasonableness of the
officer's suspicion or what he may subjectively have believed .
Judge Wright ' s opinion is an innovative and thoughtful if revisionist - treatise on the law of search and seizure .
He correctly puts aside the "plain view" exception and analyzes
this case in the framework of a Terry stop and frisk search .
He largely disregards the widely accepted view that a full
search incident to a lawful arrest is justified .
In applying Terry, Judge Wright concluded that Jenks
did not

reasonab ~ fear

bodily harm and therefore concluded

that the Terry exception was not applicable .
The minority opinion, however, took quite a different
view .

It correctly pointed out that there is a distinction between

" reasonable suspicion" for a stop and frisk (as in Terry and
Adams), and a search incident to arrest based on probable
cause .

Judge Wilkey makes a persuasive argument that this

5.
search, in the latter category, was fully justified and reasonable
under constitutional standards .

He emphasized further the

police department regulations requiring the search, and the
inherent danger to police officers under the circumstances
involved .

In this connection, see brief amicus filed by

"Americans for Effective Law Enforcement" and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, especially pp. 10, 11, 12 et seq .
Judge Wilkey focused on the "protective" nature of the search
in accordance with prescribed police regulations .

He did not

disagree with Judge Wright's point that the purpose of this
search was not to obtain evidence related to the offense of
driving without a valid permit .
Judge Wilkey makes a telling point (although in overly
strong language) at p . 73a, 74a of the petition :
"In Terry the Court described a permissible
1 fri sk 1 in these terms :
(T)he officer must feel with sensitive
fingers every portion of the prisoner's body .
A thorough search must be made of the prisoner ' s
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the
groin area about the testicles, and entire
surface of the legs down to the feet .
It is utterly inconceivable to me that Judge
Wright can take this as the accepted standard
for a permissible 1 frisk 1 - but take it they
must b~cause this is the Supreme Court's
standard fMXXKX~RxmXXX±RXRXX~X±XN - and yet
hold impermissible Officer Jenks 1 search of
the contents of the outer pocket of Robinson's
car coat, a protective search made after
arrest by the officer alone at 11 : 10 p . m.
as a prelude to taking custody and transporting
the prisoner ." (p . 73a-74a)

....
6.
One distinction to keep in mind, which was recognized
by both opinions with varying degrees of emphasis is that this
was not a routine traffic arrest in which police officers
customarily issue "tickets " or summonses, rather this was an
arrest for driving after revocation of a permit (and in this
case where a second permit had been obtained frauduently) .
In these circumstances, as noted above, the officer• was
required to arrest the suspect, bring him to headquarters and
have him booked .

The police regulation requiring a " full field

search" is applicable only to such an arrest, and not to the
issuance of a traffic ticket .

I consider this distinction to

be an important one .
Exclusionary Rule
I will not touch upon the exclusionary rule in this
hurried memorandum bey6nd saying that the SG has " gone all out "
to persuade the Court to adopt a modification - along the lines
of the ALI proposal - to the present unbending, unthinking and
arbitrary application of the exclusionary rule .

It is not clear

to me that we need to reach this issue in this case as I am
inclined -

XNXN

subject to further study and conference - to

agree with Judge Wilkey ' s anal ysis of the underlying, substantive
issue .

But if we do reach the exclusionary rul e issue, I will

want to give serious consideration to the ALI formulat ion .
I have looked at the proposed offic i al draft No . 1 of the ALI

7.
Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure .

This was adopted at

the ALI spring meeting, and is now incorporated - I believe
without change - as official draft No. 1, July 15, 1972 which I have not examined .
For a discussion of the ALI Rule see p. 42 R± et seq .
of the brief for the United States filed June 6 .

See also

the illuminating discussion by Judge Wilkey - in which he
suggests that Judge Wright took undue liberty with the Code in footnote 33 to the dissenting opinion, pp . 74a-76a of
Appendix to the Petition.
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This,J I think,

YoU.' further, ,comment that "this

chances
than 50/50.

It you have th.e opp'o rtun1 ty atter

~

completing ~ your
'

'

other "summar ·a.tudies", you might develop turter your ., '<,,.·r: · · ·
'.

l:;

and possibly rough 1t': outr as a dratt opinion.'·

ur

t

~

'i.{

~

,(

• I ;' am by no means sure that there would be probable cause tor
arrest merely because ot the failure of' the driver to have .. a
license, as c1rc\lll1$tancea can vary quite widely. It, for example,
you were stopped en route to the Court one morning and h&d
simply forgotten your license but had· other conclusive evidence
ot identity, address and DC residency, I am not at all sure it
would be reasonable tor an ·O fficer to drag you ott to the
pplice station and certainly not to make a fUll search •

. ,. .

)

•
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

From:

John C. Jeffries, Jr.

Date:

August 28, 1973

No. 72-936 United States v. Robinson
No. 71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida

This is the completed draft of my summer study memo on Robinson,
Gustafson, and the exclusionary rule.

You have already seen Part I.

Part II begins on page 2 7 .
I look forward to returning to these cases in a more directed
fashion after hearing from you.

JCJjr/gg

MEMORANDUM

c.

TO:

J.ir. John

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Je: f ries, Jr.

DA'i'E:

August 31, 1973

No. '7"2- 936 U.S • v. Hobins on
No. ,Tl ... 1662 Gustafson v. . lorida.
Hy thanks for your

completed summer study :tnemo on the

above cases and the exclusionary rule.

It is an excellent memo,

reflecting careful and thoughtful work.
We will do some talking about these cases after I
have l1ad an O?portunity to consider them more carefully, and

when we are a little

~loser

in to argument and decision.

I

Will confine myself now - hurriedly and perhaps more viscerally

truu1 analytically - to a few random comments on Part II.
1.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to say, in view of

Bustamante, that I do not regard the exclusionary rule as a
constitutional right of the individual.

I view it, rather,

as a remedy designed to effectuate Fourth Amenrunent rights which

has been givena measure of constitutional status
There is nothing in the Constitution

itself~

by

this Court.

its history, or

the English ex erience from which we derived most of our concepts

of personal rights of' a.ccused personal! to justify enshtining

the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right.
2.

It is true, as lTof. Oaks conceded, that we do

not yet k:now enough abo ·1t the exclusionary l"Ule in operation
to draw many pos:ttive e.nd final conclusions.

,,

';

'

,,.

Yet, while

2• .

admitting to a bit of ''rhetoric 11 on both sides, the dogmatic

rhetoric 1n some of' the opinions of the Court as to the efficacy
of the exclusionary rttle, without benefit of evidence of any
kidd, is hardly equaled by anything I have ae.e n on the other
side ot this argument.

Moreover, if indeed deterrence 1s the

basis ot the rule (as Justice Brennan and others have said
repeatedly), empirical evidence 1& searecely required to know
that in many of the situations 1n whieh the rule bas been applied

the police could not have been deterred for the simple reasonc

-

that they could not possibly have anticipated in advance how
judges, who disagree frequently and unpredictably among

the~

selves, will decide whether a particular search violated the
Fourth.

Except tor the general educational value of the rule

(which hae been significant), I would be hard to convince that
it actually deters - or indeed should deter* ... many of the
limtted searahes made 1n good :ta:!.th under the customary exigent
circumstances of a warrantless search.

3.

You reter, a.s an analogous situation, to Miranda

a.e having a Wholesome etrect on law enforcement pra.ctiees.

One

m.a.y doubt whether this 1a comparable 1n view of the relative

simplicity of enforcing the t-t ira.nda rule as compared with the
infinite complexities and unforeseeable variations likely to
e.xiet in search cases.

Wtt

sanc~!ona

Probably ever police department or any

were such as to cause police to be more teartul

ot e. technical violation than determined to apprehend and

convict criminals, I'm not at all sure this would be desirable.

'·

'

size in the country today complies formalistically with Miranda
by the simple 4evice or having printed torms which are read

routinely a.nd by rote at the 4eaignated times and places.
Incidentally, I ha.ve observed personally this ritual when
riding with police officers on night be&.te.
!J.,

Perhaps

my

principal reservation with respect to

your Part II is the extent to wh1¢h it i .ndica.tea that the basic
choices confronting the Court (and me as an individual Justice
keenly interested in this problem) are reduced to two:

(1)

retain the exclusionary rule in 1taatull sweep, just as it it
were written verbatim 1n the Oonatitut.i on; or (ii) abandon it

altogether.
Althous;h you address several "halfway houses", you
emphasize the problems - and

with respect to each ot them.

ot

cou.l!'se they are not imaginary -

One of the intermediate positions,

to which I am alr$ady committed• is the distinction between
application of the rule at trial and on direct review, and ita
application in post-conviction cases.

On principle I would,

as you .s uggest, apply this distinction to federal as well a.a
state

post~oonviction

proceedings, although the federal-state

relationship - which doee implicate constitutional principle indicates a need tor gr•a.ter restraint with :respect to extending
a tede:ral court ... made rule to state coll&.teral proceed1nga.
I do not presently view the choice as being narrowed
to the two ext.remes you au.ggest.

Nor would I consider adoption

'

'
·'

.

4.
o~

the ALI position an abandonment of the exclusionary principle.

I cannot follow you in stating that the ALI proposal is not
significantly 1'less drastic than outright abolition! {p. 41).

-

You are correct, ot course, in saying that the allowing or any
discretion by the courts would result in a. .,case-by-case
application ot the exclusionary sanction" and would mean a
"sacrifice

or

uniformity".

But this is hardly something new

in our law, and indeed one of the principal functions of' courts
and juries is to apply many

or

our trallltional rules precisely

in this manner.
Your draft further suggests that there would be considerable sac:rifice of "fairness in the criminal justice system".
If fairness is measured only in terms of the rights of aecused
persona without regard to the rights of society and the societal
interest in an effective as well as a fair system, of course,
you would be right.

But I incline to a balancing - even if

this is left to judges on e. case-by-ease basis (as I ltnow ot
no other way) ... of the comi,eting but legitimate interests here
involved.

I do not find the ALI position as "unstructured 11 as
you do.

It enumerates, as you correctly point out, certain

standards or criteria tor determining when the extluaionary
rule is to be &J)plied.

These standards, although subject to

interpretation and the applying of judgment in a particular

case, are fairly specific and would provide reasonable guidelines
to the conscientious judge.
In suggesting that the ALI formulation would constitute
an abandonment, you further state that the rule's deterrent
potential would be
needed most."
persuaded.

"com~letely

eliminated prtoiaely where it is

While this is an arguable view, I a.m not yet

As stated above, it 1s unlikely that any rule, short

of some drastic civil or criminal penalty on police themselves,
will deter the good faith type of error wh1ch1he ALI would except
from the present rule.

If no one really knows how the

ex~lusionary

rule will be applied in such cases, how can one expect it to
deter the individual policeman confronted with an emergency
situation where he must act on his own initiative?

It is the

"substantial" violation of Fourth Amendment rights, a.s identified
by the ALI standards,

~mich

must be deterred.

There is less

risk of serious or significant infringement of the protected
privacy

or

law abiding citizens in the typical ngood faith

error" type of case.
I agree with the observations made earlier in your

memorandum (p. 29) to the effect that applying the exclusionary
rule as a constitutional right (which appears to be your
alternative to abandonment) is unprincipled because of "its
sheer extravagance".

As you perceptively note, the suppression

of evidence does not simply return the defendant to the status

6.
quo ante, but rather confers on him an undeserved immunity from

prosecution.

It .s trikes me that something is fundamentally

fallacious in slavish adherence to e. rule l'thich produces such a
bizarre result.
The English, famed for their civilized system of criminal
Justice and their zeal for safeguarding the rights of accused
persons, manage to operate their system fairly and more eftectively
than we do without an arbitrary exclusionary rule. English judges
exercise a sound discretion basically along the lines proposed

by the ALI in determining whether to suppress the seized

evidence~

The English police are perhaps better disciplined than ours, and

it is true that the English judges function in a closer relationship to each other than is possible in this country.

But after

discounting these differences, it is to be remembered that we
do have the Supreme Court which in the end will be the final
arbiter of the application of any relaxation or the exclusionary
rule and there is no reason to believe that this Court will
tolerate a significant dilution of Fourth Amendment rights any

more than tht English courts have.

*****
As is evident from the foregoing, I instinctively
suspect the meri·t of any rule that forecloses all judicial
discretion and allows admittedly guilty

~erendants

to go free -

especially when there is genuine doubt as to the ett1cacy of

t~ ·•'

-

7.
the rule in accomplishing its avowed purpose.
write on a clean slate.

But we do not

I would not therefore argue for the

abolition of the exclusionary rule.

I cannot a.nd do not wish

to ignore or overturn the entire body of case law supporting
the principle or the rule.

I am searching (and greatly value

your thoughtful assistance) as were the scholars and judges who
drafted e.nd adopted the ALI proposal, tor a. more rational
position than that which has evolved from the judicial process
since 1914.
Your thinking and questioning stimulate me to do
likewise.

Tlus is the beat way to come up with a good answer.

L.F .. P., Jr.
ss

..

'

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. John C. Jeffries, Jr.

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

August 31, 1973

No. 72-936 U.S. v. Robinson
No. 71w1669 Gustafson v. Florida
My thanks for your completed summer study memo on the
above cases and the exclusionary rule.

It is an excellent memo,

reflecting careful and thoughtful work.
t'le

will do some talking about these cases after I

have had an opportunity to consider them more carefully, and
when we are a little &loser in to argument and decision.

I

will confine myself now - hurriedly and perhaps more viscerally
than analytically - to a few random comments on Part II.
1.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to say, in view of

Bustamante, that I do not regard the exclusionary rule as a
constitutional right of the individual.

I view it, rather,

as a remedy designed to effectuate Fourth Amendment rights which
has been givena measure of constitutional status by this Court.
There is nothing in the Constitution itself, its history, or
the English experience from which we derived most of our concepts
of personal rights of accused persons, to justify enshtining
the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right.
2.

It is true, as Prof . Oaks conceded, that we do

not yet know enough about the exclusionary rule in operation
to draw many positive and final conclusions.

Yet, while

2.

-

admitting to a bit of "rhetoric" on both aides, the dogmatic
rhetoric in some of the opinions of the Court as to the efficacy
of the exclusionary rule, without benefit of evidence of any
kidd, is hardly equaled by anything I have seen on the other
side of this argument.

Moreover, if indeed deterrence is the

basis of the rule (as Justice Brennan and others have said
repeatedly), empirical evidence is scarfcely required to know
that in many of the situations in which the rule has been applied
the police cpuld

~

have been deterred for the simple reasonc

that they could not possibly have anticipated in advance how
judges, who disagree frequently and unpredictably among themselves, will decide whether a particular search violated the
Fourth.

Except for the general educational value of the rule

(which has been significant), I would be hard to convince that
it actually deters - or indeed should deter* - many of the
limtted searches made in good faith under the customary exigent
circumstances of a warrantless search.

3. You refer, as an analogous situation, to Miranda
as having a wholesome effect on law enforcement practices.

One

may doubt whether this is comparable in view of the relative
simplicity of enforcing the Miranda rule as compared with the
infinite complexities and unforeseeable variations likely to
exist in search cases.

Probably evert.1 police department of any
y

*!f sanctions were such as to cause police to be more fearful
of a technical violation than determined to apprehend and
convict criminals, I'm not at all sure this would be desirable.

'• .

. ..

size in the country today complies formalistically with Miranda
by the simple Jievice of having prin·ted forms which are read
routinely and by rote at the designated times and plaees.
Incidentally, I have observed personally this ritual when
riding with police officers on night beats.

4.

Perhaps my principal reservation with respect to

your Part II is the extent to which it indicates that the basic
choices confronting the Court (and me as an individual Justice
keenly interested in this problem) are reduced to two:

(i)

'
retain the exclusionary .rule in itssfull
sweep, just as if it
·f '

were written verbatim in the Constitution; or (ii) abandon it
altogether.
Although you address several "halfway houses 11 , you
emphasize the problems - and of course they are not imaginary with respect to each of them.

One of the intermediate positions,

to which I am already committed, is the distinction between
application of the rule at trial and on direct review, and its
application in post-conviction cases.

On principle I would,

as you suggest, apply this distinction to federal as well as
state post-conviction proceedings, although the federal-state
relationship - which does implicate constitutional principle indicates a need for greater restraint with respect to extending
a federal

court~made

rule to state collateral proceedings.

I do not presently view the choice as being narrowed
to the two extremes you suggest.

I

.

Nor would I consider adoption

4.
of the ALI nosition an abandonment of the exclusionary principle.
I cannot follow you in stating that the ALI proposal is not
significantly nless drastic than outright
You~

abolition~

(p.

~1).

correct, of course, in saying that the allowing of any

discretion by the courts would result in a. "case-by-case
application of the exclusionary sanction" and would mean a
"sacrifice of uniformity 11 •

But this is hardly something new

in our law, and indeed one of the principal functions of courts
and juries is to apply many of our tra!4tional rules precisely
in this manner.
Your draft further suggests that there would be considerable sacrifice of

11

fairness in the criminal justice system 11 •

If fairness is measured only in terms of the rights of ascused
persons without regard to the rights of society and the societal
interest in an effective as well as a fair system, of course,
you l'lOuld be right.

But I incline to a balancing - even if

this is left to judges on a case-by-case baois (as I know of
no other \'lay) - of the competing but legitimate interests here
involved.
I do not find the ALI position as
you do.

11

unstructured 11 as

It enumerates, as you correctly point out, certain

standards or criteria for determining when the exllusionary
rule is to be applied.

These standards, although subject to

interpretation and the applying of judgment in a particular

'

'

.

-

5.
case, are fairly specific and would provide reasonable guidelines
to the conscientious judge,
In suggesting that the ALI formulation would constitute
an abandonment, you further state that the rule's deterrent
potential would be "completely elimina.ted prllcisely where it is
needed most.n
persuaded.

While this is an arguable view, I am not yet

As stated above, it is unlikely that any rule, short

of some drastic civil or criminal penalty on police themselves,
will deter the good faith type of error which the ALI would except
from the present rule.

If no one really knows how the exilusionary

rule will be applied in such cases, how can one expect it to
deter the individual policeman confronted with an emergency
situation where he must act on his own initiative?

It is the

"substantial" violation of Fourth Amendment rights, as identified
by the ALI standards, l'Thich must be deterred.

There is less

risk of serious or significant infringement of the protected
privacy of law abiding citizens in the typical "good faith
error" type of case.
I agree with the observations made earlier in your
memorandum (p. 29) to the effect that applying the exclusionary
rule as a constitutional right (which appears to be your
alternative to abandonment) is unprincipled because of nits
sheer extravagance".

As you perceptively note, the suppression

of evidence does not simply return the defendant to the status

6.
quo ante, but rather confers on him an undeserved immunity from
prosecution.

It strU:es me that something is fundamentally

fallacious in slavish adherence to a rule which produces such a
bizarre result.
The English, famed for their civilized system of criminal
justice and their zeal for safeguarding the rights of accused
persons, rnanage to operate their system fairly and more effectively
than we do without an arbitrary exclusionary rule. English judges
exercise a sound discretion basically along the lines proposed
by the ALI in determining whether to suppress the seized evidence.
The English police are perhaps better disciplined than ours, and
it is true that the English judges function in a closer relationship to each other than is possible in this country.

But after

discounting these differences, it is to be remembered that we
do have the Supreme Court which in the end will be the final
arbiter of the application of any relaxation of the exclusionary
rule and there is no reason to believe that this Court will
tolerate a significant dilution of Fourth Amendment r:t.ghts any
more than the English courts have.

*****
As is evident from the foregoing, I instinctively
suspect the merit of any rule that forecloses all judicial
discretion and allows admittedly guilty defendants to go free especially when there is genuine doubt as to the efficacy of

.~

•... '
•

7.
the rule in accomplishing its avowed purpose.
write on a clean slate.

But we do not

I would not therefore argue for the

abolition of the exclusionary rule .

I cannot and do not wish

to ignore or overturn the entire body of case law supporting
the principle or the rule.

I am searching (and greatly value

your thoughtful assistance) as were the scholars and judges who
drafted and adopted the ALI proposal, for a more rational
position than that which has evolved from the judicial process
since 1914.
Your thinking and questioning stimulate me to do
likewise .

This is the best way to come up with a good answer.

L.F.P. , Jr.
ss
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No. 72 ...936 u.s. v. Robinson
No. 71-1869 Gustafson v. Florida
This memorandum 18 limited to the first of the two major questions
involved in these cases, namely, what search 1s permissible incident to

a lawful arrest for a traffic Ylolatlon?
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring

separately) in an en banch opinion, severely llmtted the heretofore accepted
rule that searches of an lndlvldual's person (net hls premises) tnctdental
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.
In Robinson it 1s conceded that there was probable cause (driving

with a fraudulent llceJUJe) for a custodial arrest. Judge Wrlgbt developed

his position from Ter!1 and Stbron, the "stop and frtsk" eases allowiDg
a ''pat down" for weapons but nothing more. Judge Wright would allow
a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a
emdttlon to a further search .. a determlnatloo by the officer of probable

cause or exigent circumstances. Nc:t just for the a:rrest but for a search
which goes beyond a mere frisk.
In substance, Wrlpt'a opinion requires an Independent evaluation

of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest vh 1cb goes

beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not extat

becaue ot the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed
sometime previously).

''

.

I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would:
(1) Weaken the capability of police officers to

protect themselves when making lawful arrests.
( 11) It depends upcm subjective judgments, made on the

spot by the arresting officers, whtch would be difficult 1f not

impossible to apply;
(111) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing

between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter
for the scOJ)! of the particular search, Introduces possibly far
reaching consequences into this area of the law. •
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda 1n my
ftle, I would reverse R.obtnson.

•••••
gustafson presents a more dUftcult problem. The traffic offense
(weaving across tile center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's
permit) certainly juetUled a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so
held. But the tramc offenses in Gustafson were mtnor compared to
the fraudulent driver's llceue involved In Robtnson. It could be aaue<t
that, tn the Oastafson circumstances, a custOiltal arrest was unnecessary

•Tiiii eourt has many times articulated as a well settled principle the
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See e.;. , Weeks v. u.S.,
232 U.S. 883, 392; Carroll v. U.s., 287 U.S. tW,tS"S; Preston v. U:T.;"
376 u.s. 364, 36'1; Peters v. u.s. (under the name of 81bron v. u. s:;-f92
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. '17; Chlmel v. Ca1lfo~"3ft u.s.
'152, 762-!l83; and CupP v. MU!Phf, deetded JiSt May 29 (see SO's brief
pp. 16-17).

3.
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate.
If I start,

as I do, from the positicm. that a lawful custodial arrest

justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the questlm remains
open tn a particular ease as to whether a custodial arrest was tn faet
justUled. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's oplnion In Amador-Gonzales

v. yntted States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext
to enable the pollee to conduct an incidental search. WhUe this milht be
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would net neeeuarUy
be a futUe remedy 1n extreme cases.

For example, on routine traffic

violations (e. g. running a red.Ught or making a wrong left turn) moat
pollee departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a
summons (absent a nonresident violator) U an officer, contrary to aueh
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic

violation, arguably this would be pretextual.
I am inclined to remand Dutafsoo. to afford him an opportunity to
show that the arrest was pretextual under the facts of his cue.

lfp/ss 9/26/73 2cc

Summary memo, prepared for possible use
at Conference

No. 72-936 U.S. v. Robinson
No. 71-1669 Gustafson v. Florida
This memorandum is limited to the first of the two major questions
involved in these cases, namely, what search is permissible incident to
a lawful arrest for a traffic violation?
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring
separately) in an en bane opinion, severely limited the heretofore accepted
rule that searches of an individual's person (not his premises) incidental
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.
In Robinson it is conceded that there was probable cause (driving
with a fraudulent license) for a custodial arrest.

Judge Wright developed

his position from Terry and Sibron, the "stop and frisk" cases allowing
a "pat down" for weapons but nothing more.

Judge Wright would allow

a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a
condition to a further search - a determination by the officer of probable
cause or exigent circumstances. Not just for the arrest but for a search
which goes beyond a mere frisk.
In substance, Wright's opinion requires an independent evaluation

of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest v.h ich goes
beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not exist
because of the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed
sometime previously).

2.
I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would:
(i) Weaken the capability of police officers to
protect themselves when making lawful arrests.
(ii) It depends upon subjective judgments, made on the
spot by the arresting officers, which would be difficult if not
impossible to apply;
(iii) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing
between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter
for the scope of the particular search, introduces possibly far
reaching consequences into this area of the law.*
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda in my
file, I would reverse Robinson.
*****
Gustafson presents a more difficult problem. The traffic offense
(weaving across the center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's
permit) certainly justified a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so
held. But the traffic offenses in Gustafson were minor compared to
the fraudulent driver's license involved in Robinson. It could be argued
that, in the Gustafson circumstances, a custodial arrest was unnecessary
*This Court has many times articulated as a well settled principle the
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See, ~· ~·, Weeks v. U.S.,
232 U.S. 383, 392; Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 158; Preston v. U.S.,
376 U.S. 364, 367; Peters v. U.S. (under the name of 'Sibron v. U. S-:-;3"92
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. 77; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762-763; and Cupp v. Murphy, decided last May 29 (see SG's brief
pp. 16-17).

3.
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate.
If I start, as I do, from the position that a lawful custodial arrest

justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the question remains
open in a particular case as to whether a custodial arrest was in fact
justified. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's opinion in Amador- Gonzales
v. United States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext
to enable the police to conduct an incidental search. While this might be
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would not necessarily
be a futile remedy in extreme cases.

For example, on routine traffic

violations (e. g. running a redlight or making a wrong left turn) most
police departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a
summons (absent a nonresident violator) if an officer, contrary to such
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic
violation, arguably this would be pretextual.
I am inclined to remand 3IS:afson to afford him an opportunity to
show that the arrest was pretextual under the facts of his case.

lfp/ss 9/26/73 2cc

Summary memo, prepared for possible use
at Conference

No. 72-936 U. S. v. Robinson
No. 71 .. 1669 Gustafson v. Florida
This memorandum is limited to the first of the two major questions
involved in these cases, namely, what search is permissible incident to
a lawful arrest for a traffic violation?
Judge Wright, speaking for a plurality (and with Bazelon concurring
separately) in an en banch opinion, severely limited the heretofore accepted
rule that searches of an individual's person (not his premises) incidental
to a lawful arrest constitute an exception to the warrant requirement.
In Robinson it is conceded that there was probable cause (driving

with a fraudulent license) for a custodial arrest. Judge Wright developed
his position from Terry and Sibron, the "stop and frisk" cases allowing
a "pat down" for weapons but nothing more. Judge Wright would allow
a "weapons frisk" upon a custodial arrest, but he would require - as a
condition to a further search -a determination by the officer of probable
cause or exigent circumstances. Not just for the arrest but for a search
which goes beyond a mere frisk.
In substance, Wright's opinion requires an independent evaluation

of probable cause for every search made incident to arrest Witch goes
beyond a pat down. He recognizes that such probable cause may not exist
because of the character of the crime (a traffic violation or a vagrancy
arrest) or the mere passages of time. (Such as a burglary committed
sometime previously).

2.
I cannot accept Judge Wright's emasculation of the long established
right to search incident to lawful arrest. His decision would:
(i) Weaken the capability of police officers to
protect themselves when making lawful arrests.
(11) It depends upon subjective judgments, made on the
spot by the arresting officers, which would be difficult if not
impossible to apply;
(iii) Judge Wright's underlying rationale, distinguishing
between probable cause for arrest and probable cause thereafter
for the scope of the particular search, introduces possibly far
reaching consequences into this area of the law. •
For these reasons, more fully elaborated by memoranda in my
file, I would reverse Robinson•

•••**
9ttstafson presents a more difficult problem. The traffic offense
(weaving across tlte center line late at night, and the absence of a driver's
permit) certainly justified a lawful arrest, and the Florida courts so
held. But the traffic offenses in Gustafson were minor compared to
the fraudulent driver's license involved in Robinson. It could be acgued
that, in the Gustafson circumstances, a custocdial arrest was unnecessary
*This Court has many times articulated as a well settled principle the
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest. See e. 1-, Weeks v. u.s.,
232 U.S. 383, 392; Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 1~15""8; Preston v. u:a,
376 u.s. 364, 367; Peters v. U.S. (under the name of 81bron v. u. S:-;3'92
40; and especially Harlan's dissent at p. 77; Chimel v. California~ u.s.
752, '162-!l63; and Cupp v. Murphy, decided last May 29 (see SG's brief
pp. 16-17).

3.
and unreasonable, and that a traffic summons would have been adequate.
If I start, as I do, from the position that a lawful custodial arrest

justifies a fully evidentiary search of the person, the question remains
open in a particular case as to whether a custodial arrest was in fact
justified. As indicated by Judge Wisdom's opinion in Amador-Gonzales
v. United States, 391 F. 2d 308, a custodial arrest may be a mere pretext
to enable the police to conduct an incidental search. While this might be
difficult to prove, the remedy should be available and would not necessarily
be a futile remedy in extreme cases.

For example, on routine traffic

violations (e. g. running a redlight or making a wrong left turn) most
police departments have regulations requiring only the issuance of a
summons (absent a nonresident violator) if an officer, contrary to such
a regulation, elected to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic
violation, arguably this would be pretextual.
I am inclined to remand nutafson to afford him an opportunity to
show that the arrest was pretextual under the facts of his case.

,,

'

-----SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

United States v. Robinson
Gustafson v. Florida

I have reread your opinions in Uniteg States v .
United States District Court and Almeida-Sanche.z , and neither
speaks directly to the issues rased here.

Of course, you

embraced the warrant requirement, but search incident to
arrest has long been considered an exception thereto.

The

most nearly relevant passage comes from U.S._Qist Cta
It is true that there have been some exceptions
to the warrant requirement. LCitations omitted~?
But those exceptions are few in number and carefully
delineated ... ; in general they serve the legitimate
needs of law enforcement officers to protect their
own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction.
Even while carving out those exceptions, the Court has
reaffirmed the principle that the "police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seiaures through the warrant procedure . " Terry
v. Ohio, supra, at 20, •.. ; Chimel v. California,
supra, at762 .
32 LEd 2d 752, XK 767.

This passage may be read to endorse

in a general way the twin rationales of Terry as the only
acceptable rationales for warrantless searches.

I think this

construction places too heavy a burden on the language used.
It is clear that you were not addressing the case of a search
incident to lawful arrest.

In short, I think your opinions

in past cases pose no substantial obstacle to your proposed
resolution of Robinson and Gustafson.
JCJjr

•
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